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ABSTRACT
China has experienced fast development in the past decades. This dissertation studies several
topics related to the recent development issues in rural and urban China. Section 2 studies China’s
urbanization since the 2010s. In Section 3, I study the factor utilization in the agricultural sector in
rural China while Section 4 studies the education investment and human capital accumulation for
Chinese high school students.
First, urbanization is a key path for countries to achievement development. China’s rapid eco-
nomic growth over the past 40 years has been accompanied by an increasingly rapid rate of urban-
ization, from less than 20% in the late 1970s to almost 60% in the 2010s. In addition to natural
population growth, rural-urban migration is generally believed to be a dominant driving force of
the urbanization process. In Section 2, however, I demonstrate that a large share of urban pop-
ulation growth comes from community reclassification. I find that these in situ migrants (from
communities which were reclassified from rural to urban) accounted for almost 35% of total urban
population growth in the first half of the 2010s. Households in reclassified communities share
similar characteristics with rural village communities, particularly in their ownership of housing.
Furthermore, I provide evidence that the scale of in situ migrants is significantly related to residen-
tial land supply at the prefecture level.
Moreover, the development of agricultural sector is also of great significance for a highly pop-
ulous developing country like China. Secure property rights are key determinants of economic
development. In developing countries where agricultural activities still play a major role, prop-
erty rights in rural land become critical. In Section 3, I evaluate the impact of land certification
program in rural China. Employing a panel dataset of over 1,000 villages all across the country
and exploiting the variations in years of certification, I find that less agricultural land is left idle in
villages where the land has been certified. This result is robust to various checks including using
a more comparable control group from the propensity score matching method. Such effects are
more significant in high-income villages or those from provinces in which the economy highly
ii
depends on the agricultural sector. Additionally, I document evidence that the effect of land certi-
fication program on improving land utilization might be a result that households with land being
certified are more likely to transfer their cultivated land to new agricultural business entities that
might possibly increase land utilization.
Finally, the development of human capital and investment in education play a fundamental
role for long-run development. Household investment in children’s education is among one of
the largest shares of inter-generational investments. In Section 4, I study whether changes in op-
portunity costs of re-taking a high-stake exam caused by an exogenous policy result in different
levels of household investment in children’s education. Specifically, I employ the curriculum re-
form of senior high school in mainland China in 2000s and demonstrate that students in the last
cohort using old curriculum are faced with a more difficult situation in terms of re-taking College
Entrance Examination since their re-taking costs are much higher due to the curriculum switch.
Using province-level administrative data, I confirm the pattern that the adoption of the new cur-
riculum significantly reduces the number of re-takers at its introduction year. I then study the effect
of this changing opportunity cost on household investments in senior high school students. Em-
pirical results indicate that households with students facing higher re-taking opportunity costs are
more likely to have equipments and inputs that help improve their learning efficiency. However, I
do not find any long-term effect after students are enrolled into college.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Development in China’s Urbanization Process
Urbanization has played a key role in the global development in the past century, and also,
in the current century. According to the World Urbanization Prospects from the United Nations,
the urban population of the world has grown rapidly from 751 million in 1950 to 4.2 billion in
2018, accounting for 55% of the world population. This ratio is expected to increase to 68% in
2050. Yet, the urbanization of the current century is different, most obviously because of the
accelerated growth of urban population and cities in developing countries ([23]). China, as the
most populous country, has experienced remarkable economic achievements since the reform in the
1970s, a transformation from a agricultural dominated planned economy to an export, consumer-
good-oriented economy with a highly developed industry sector and an emerging and fast growing
service sector ([25]). As most manufacturing and service production is most efficient in urban areas
such as industrial parks ([59]) and special economic zones ([1]) that benefit from agglomeration,
the urbanization process in China has also experienced rapid growth since the reform ([19]). The
urbanization rate increased from less than 20% in the late 1970s to almost 60% in the 2010s. This
is the largest and perhaps one of the fastest urbanization processes in human history ([12]). Figure
1.1 shows that only in the first 15 years of this new millennium, China’s urban population increased
from 459 million to 771 million.
Accompanied by this large wave of urbanization is the booming in the urban housing market.
Before 1990s, households in urban areas who worked for the state-owned enterprises were assigned
housing units by their work units with low rents. In 1993, approximately 40 percent of urban
households in China were residing in state-owned housing ([46]). In a housing reform in 1994,
state-owned housing units were no longer provided and private housing market quickly developed.
For example, in 2005, the quantiy of newly completed residential construction reached 28.4 million
square meteres in Beijing, which accounted for 13.1% of the city’s existing housing stock ([58]).
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Figure 1.1: Urban Population Growth and the Rate of Urbanization in China
At the national level, Figure 1.2 graphically illustrates the increments of the housing construction
in China’s urban areas1. Between 2000 and 2012, accounting for the demolished housing units, the
added housing units in urban areas was about 80.96 million. During the same period, the number
of added urban households was around 92.46 million.
Figure 1.2: Urban Household Growth and Housing Supply
1Data about the added housing unit size in urban areas is from the 2014 China Statistical Yearbook. The last year
in which this variable is available is 2012. There is only information on the total size of newly built residential houses
on a yearly basis from 1985 to 2012. I assume the average size per housing unit is 90 square meters. Data about the
annual demolished urban housing units are estimated based on the 2013 wave of China Household Finance Survey.
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In contrast, according to a recent study by China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) in 2015,
there are approximately 50 million vacant housing units located in urban areas all over China.
These vacant units consist of houses and apartments which are not occupied by their owners for a
variety of reasons, such as temporary migration or that the homeowners own multiple properties
that are not occupied by themselves or anyone else. This number is high not only in absolute values
but also in percentages; these units accounts for more than 22% of all urban housing units. Table
1.1 shows the housing vacancy rate in other economies. Though there are some discrepancies in
accounting for the vacant housing units, urban China’s housing vacancy rate still ranks the highest
among all listed countries or regions.
Table 1.1: International Comparisons for the Housing Vacancy Rate
Year Vacancy Rate Source
Australia 2017 2.5%a SQM Research
Brazil 2012 11.3% Ministério das Cidades
China (Urban) 2014 22.4% China Household Finance Survey
Germany 2011 4.5%b Statistisches Bundesamt
Hong Kong 2013 4.1%c Hong Kong Property Review
Japan 2013 13.5% Statistic Bureau of Japan
Mexico 2010 14.2%d INEGI 2010 Population and Housing Census
Singapore 2014 7.8%e Yearbook of Statistics Singapore
United States 2014 13.4%f United States Census Bureau
a This number refers to the rental vacancy rate, conducted monthly by a private Australian research company.
b According to the micro census, a vacant property is defined as a housing unit in which no interview partner
was found even after multiple visits.
c This number refers to Vacant housing units at the end of the year as a percentage of total housing stock.
d A vacant home is defined as dwelling that is offered for sale or rent, rented or sold awaiting occupancy, or
held off market for other reasons. This excludes housing for temporal use.
e This number refers to the percentage of the existing stock that is vacant. Vacant Houses are defined as vacant
units/space that are/is not physically occupied.
f This number refers to the share of vacant housing units as of all housing units. Vacant housing units include
both year-round vacant units and seasonal vacant units.
This is the first trial to use large-sampled household survey data to estimate the number of
vacant housing units nationwide. After the result was released, it raised a nationwide debate on
whether the estimate of 50 million vacant housing units is reasonable given that there would be an
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approximate equality between the added urban housing units and the added urban households if I
regard them as the supply and demand sides.
Motivated by these two seemingly contradictory facts, in Section 2.1.2, I aim to address this
question from a new perspective on Chinese urbanization. That is, I solve this high-vancacy-rate
puzzle by fully understanding composition of those newly added members of the urban population
while providing a new statistical framework for China’s urbanization.
Besides natural growth from birth and death, urban population growth is a dynamic process
that consists of two main sources: migration from rural to urban areas (relocating migrants) and
urbanization by expansion of urban areas (in situ migrants) ([44]; [7]). However, rural-urban
migrants have been generally believed to be a dominant driving force of the overall urbanization
process. For example, [55] compute the amount of annual rural-urban migrants by breaking down
urban growth into natural growth and rural-urban migration; they find that the latter made dominant
contributions to urban population growth from 1978 to 1999. However, I find that quite a large
share of newly added urban residents in the first half of the 2010s resulted from the National Bureau
of Statistics’ (NBS) reclassifying communities, that is, changing their designations from rural to
urban. By encoding all 700,000 communities on the NBS website from 2009 to 2017 and using
their respective rural-urban division codes to identify rural communities that were reclassified as
urban, I estimate that in situ migrants accounted for nearly 35% of all urban population growth
during this period.
This work contributes to the vast literature on urbanization in China, both spatially and in terms
of population. Spatially, [19] employ a unique three-period panel data set of high-resolution satel-
lite imagery data to study the extent of and the factors driving urban expansion in China from the
late 1980s to 2000. They find that the growth of income and population in a city play powerful roles
in China’s urban exansion. [37] theoretically demonstrate how fiscal and governance reforms give
rise to land conversion decisions and long run urban spatial sizes. These papers mainly talk about
how urban area expands due to economic activities, for example, land converted from agricultural
use into industrial or residential uses. My work documents and measures the spatial expansion of
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urban areas from a statistical perspective on which urbanization rate is based. In terms of popu-
lation, I complement the work of [44] and [7] by providing the estimated composition of urban
population growth in the 2010s. [44] uses census data from 1990 and 2000 and estimate different
sources of urban population growth in 1990s while [7] use their methods to account for China’s
urbanization in 2000s2. However, both of these two papers are only able to measure at the national
level. Different from theirs, I could measure different sources at a more disaggregated level on a
yearly basis.
Furthermore, I also employ the survey data set to document the characteristics of those urban-
ized population due to urban expansions. Employing survey data collected by CHFS at both the
household and community levels, I empirically show that these communities, though statistically
reclassified as urban, retain their basic rural characteristics, and residents in these communities
continue to share similar living conditions with rural villagers. Moreover they have limited afford-
ability to participate in local housing markets. I thus show that urbanized population should not be
treated equally since a large share of urban population growth comes from the urban land expansion
who are not living in a truly urbanized environment. As a result, previous studies on determinants
or consequences of urbanization in China might be misleading. For example, [34] study how hous-
ing prices increase in Chinese cities might have impact on household saving behavior. Given that
housing prices could be affected by some macro-level factors, they use the province-level changes
of urbanization rate as an excluded instrument, which implies that increases in urban population
leads to more demand in the urban housing markets, thus increase the price. However, based on
my analysis, this does not hold for urban population who comes from urban land expansion.
In addition, I apply this new urbanization framework to land and housing markets at the pre-
fecture level. At the prefecture level, I show that not only the overall urban population growth
is a strong predictor of the future residential land supply, but also the scale of in situ migrants is
significantly related to the local residential land supply. This implies that a mismeasurement of
urbanization might explain the surplus of housing units and result in a high vacant rate in China’s
2Their method and results will be discussed in Section 2.1.2.
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urban areas, as reported by CHFS. Thus, my work also contributes to the literature on the primary
land market in China. For example, [53] show that government intervention enlarges the impact of
positive productivity shocks on housing price appreciation, through mainly the government con-
trol over residential land supply. [33] shows that at the prefecture level, land supply could also be
determined by the local leaders’ career concern.
1.2 Development in China’s Rural Land Tenure Security
Recent literature postulates that institutions have a central role in facilitating economic devel-
opment ([41]; [45]). Broadly accessible and secure property rights that allow holders to enjoy the
benefits from investment without being challenged by outsiders are viewed as an important element
of an environment conducive to growth ([17]). In terms of growth in agricultural sector, although
the fact from the process of economic development is that labor will leave the agricultural sector in
favor of secondary and tertiary industries ([15]), resulting in the decline of the share of agriculture
in GDP, it still remains as an important and essential component that supports human well-being.
This is particularly true for less-developed countries in which reducing poverty is still one primary
target of the government. Rural land, as the most basic inputs of agricultural production, is a key
asset for households participating in agricultural activities. In this sense, well-defined and secure
property rights in ownership or use over land can be recognized as essential for well-functioning
institutions and economic growth in these countries ([18]; [14]).
Despite the emphasis on the importance of private property rights, collectively owned or man-
aged land remains a widespread phenomenon in the developing world ([32]). China, which has
one of the largest number of population in the agricultural sector, is among these countries where
collective land structure is predominant. The establishment of Household Responsibility System
(HRS) starting in early 1980s in China’s countryside allows each rural household to be assigned a
piece of land for management, the size of which is mainly on an egalitarian basis. On one hand,
the reform greatly incentivizes enthusiasm of rural households, leading to huge increase in agri-
cultural production. On the other hand, the Household Responsibility System and its associated
tenure arrangement remain almost identical with how it looked like at the beginning of the reform,
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especially given the tremendous social and economic change over the last forty years. One recent
theoretical paper by [10] studies why ration and contract land are a reasonable mechanism design
in China’s villages. Relying on the assumption that rural peasants migrating to the city for work
have a probability of going underground when economic condition is bad and thus cause negative
externalities that cannot be internalized by peasants themselves, they argue such ration land could
serve as a role to make sure that the peasant migrant worker has incentives to return to the village
during economic hard times.
However, the separation of land use rights from land ownership rights renders land tenure se-
curity being challenged even by state agents ([28]). In China’s rural villages, plots are periodically
subject to redistributions among all or a part of households within village by local officials, in
order to fit the demographical change over time. Moreover, the rapid urbanization process makes
land a demanding input for industrial, commercial and residential use, leading to large scale of
acquisitions for rural land by local governments, with much lower compensations than it is sold
then, which contributes to another source of systematic insecurity of land tenure.
In Section 3, I empirically test whether a land certification program launched by the central
government improves agricultural land utilization. In order to secure land contractual and man-
agerial rights for rural households, in addition to the land contract signed between local collectives
and rural households, land certificates stating the size and the boundaries of each parcel as well as
the contractual relationship were issued to rural households, since the mid-1990s and widely im-
plemented from 2013. In particular, I estimate the effects of this program on reducing agriculture
land abandonment phenomenon.
Cultivated land abandonment is a worldwide phenomenon that is driven by interlinked both
environmental and economic forces. Its effects are also related to both economic and ecological
fields. Ecologically, its negative impacts include soil erosion ([21]), reduction of landscape het-
erogeneity ([26]) etc. The most direct economic effect in the context of China is the implication to
resource misallocation and food security ([36]). China, as the most populous country in the world,
has one of the highest ratio of population to land. Having sufficient agricultural land to support
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such a large number of population independently is always a tough task. Keeping the bottom line
of total agricultural land in rural China is one primary policy object in China’s central government3.
Therefore, increasing land utilization and reducing the size of idle land for agriculture use become
fundamental in land use policies.
In contrast, the scale of cultivated land abandonment in rural China is non-negligible. [43] find
that the abandonment ratio was 37.5% in 2009 in southern Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in
northwestern China. [48] study 2 counties in Chongqing, a southwest provincial-level municipal-
ity, and show that more than 30% plots have been left abandoned since 1992.
In Section 3, I use both household-level and village-level panel datasets from China Household
Finance Survey (CHFS) which consists of more than 1,000 villages all across the country. The
village-level dataset includes detailed agricultural land information of the most two recent waves
of community survey, including timing and patterns of the land certification program. The panel
datasets from CHFS allow me to adopt a generalized difference-in-differences framework to test
the causal effect of the land certification program on agricultural land utilization. The empirical re-
sults show that the land certification program is effective in improving the utilization of agricultural
land. I then try to disentangle possible mechanisms using the household-level panel data. I fail to
find the effects of land certification program on labor migration, agricultural investments or overall
land transfer activities. However, I find evidence showing that the land certification program alters
households’ renting behaviors; that is, households with cultivated land certificate are more willing
to rent their agricultural land to new agricultural business entities rather than individual farming
households, which might help increase the scale of economy and thus the land utilization rate.
This work mainly contributes to the literature that focuses on the effects of land tenure security
on agricultural activities and related outcomes in developing countries, for example, [4] and [16]
for African countries, [14] and [31] in the context of Latin America. [16] use data from Ethiopia
and argue that the impact of land rights on investment incentives varies by type of investment. [14]
study the issuance of ownership certificates in Mexico and show that removing the link between
3In 2006, the central government raised the policy that the bottom line of the agricultural land size is 1.8 billion
Mu. This bottom line was reinforced recently in the 2013 Central Conference on Rural Work.
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land use and land rights can result in large-scale adjustments to labor and land allocations, espe-
cially the increasing probability of migrating from households with ownership certificates. In the
context of China, much of the literature focuses on its effect on developing local land transfer mar-
kets. For example, [45] study the effects of having land contract or certificate on household renting
behaviors. They find that possession of such documents encourages households to engage in land
renting to non-family members. [9] use data collected from more than 5,000 rural households in
2012 and find an increase in land renting activities and land rents from certification.
In addition, this work contributes to a growing literature studying the determinants of cultivated
land abandonment in China empirically. For example, [35] employ a multivariate linear regression
model to link livelihood strategy of household to land abandonment using a survey dataset con-
ducted in 2011 in 12 villages in Chongqing and find positive relationship between off-farm labor
choice and land abandonment. [48] use a plot-level dataset collected in 2012 in Chongqing and
employ a Logit model to test the relationship between the different sources of income and the
probability of rural land abandonment. They find that wage incomes are positively related to the
probability of land abandonment while the agriculture income has negative effects. However, both
these two papers only focus on regional cross-sectional data, which are neither nationwide repre-
sentative nor well identified.
1.3 Development in China’s Human Capital Investments
Education plays a fundamental role in formulating and developing human capital. Household
investment on children’s education is among one of the most important components of human
capital investment, which helps improve children’s ability to achieve higher educational outcomes
as well as success in the labor market. It is also credential in the economic growth of a country
([29]). There is a large body of literature studying patterns and also determinants of household
education expenditures in developed countries ([24]; [38]). However, such patterns in developing
countries such as China might differ from those in developed countries mainly in the following
two perspectives. First, the current Compulsory Education Law in China requires a minimum of
9 years’ compulsory education in contrast to at least 12 years in the United States ([11]). Thus
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households might prepare extra expenditures for further education beyond this nine-year compul-
sory education. Second, the supply of high-quality public education resources is strictly limited,
compared with an increasingly high demand, leading households to substitute these inaccessible
public resources with affordable private investments. [57] show that household educational expen-
diture accounts for almost 30% of total education spending in 2013. As a result, it would be worth
studying factors that determine levels of household educational investments in China.
In Section 4, I study how household educational investments are affected by different levels
of opportunity costs in terms of re-taking exams of students in preparation for further education
caused by an exogenous policy change. In particular, I rely on curriculum reform of high schools
in mainland China launched by the Ministry of Education to study household investment decisions
in their children who are in senior high school. In the context of education institution in China,
students graduating from senior high school (12th grade) who apply for college are required to
take the College Entrance Examination (CEE) which is held annually from the 7th to the 9th
of June, organized by educational administration of each province4. Beside, it is common for
students who fail the exam5 for the first time to repeat the 12th grade (third year in senior high
school), prepare for one more year and re-take the CEE one year later. Since settings and guidelines
of CEE are determined by curriculum upon the current cohort in the third year of senior high
school, in this sense, students from the last cohort under old curriculum are faced with a totally
different CEE framework, in contrast to both cohorts under new curriculum or others under old
curriculum. This provides a framework in which I can identify household educational investment
in senior high school students given this exogenous curriculum shock leading to their different
levels of opportunity costs to re-take CEE. Put differently, students among the last cohort under old
curriculum are faced with a different situation upon re-taking CEE. If they decide to re-take CEE,
they would spend extra time getting familiar with the new curriculum under which the forthcoming
CEE would be guided. Thus, the difficulty for them to succeed in their second trial is higher
4In some provinces, the College Entrance Exam lasts for two days.
5There is no actual passing line of such exam. Students who fail the exam simply mean that they are either not
enrolled or not enrolled into their expected university or major.
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compared with other cohorts who may re-take the CEE with consistent curriculum.
I first employ province-level administrative data from the Chinese Education Statistical Year-
books to establish the pattern that the number of CEE re-takers in years when provinces intro-
duce new curriculum is significantly lower. Using individual-level survey data from the first wave
of Beijing College Student Panel Survey, results show that households with students from the
last cohort under old curriculum are significantly more likely to have reference books and elec-
tronic devices that improve their learning efficiency. My identification strategy lies in the sharp
province by cohort variation in school curricula, allowing me to rule out confounding factors such
as province specific or cohort specific differences. In addition, the result is robust after I con-
sider the non-randomness of assignments of the introduction year of the new curriculum or after I
include the level of public investments on senior high school students. However, due to the limita-
tion of the survey data, I cannot measure investments such as asking for private tutors or attending
out-of-school classes, which account for larger portions of household educational expenditures.
Moreover, I do not find any long-run effect of these extra investments on students’ performance
after they are enrolled in college.
This work contributes directly to a growing empirical literature focusing on the effects of cur-
riculum reform. For example, [5] study the causal effect of school curricula on students political
attitudes and find that the new curriculum was often successful in changing their attitudes on im-
portant issues, in the direction intended by the Chinese government. [50] investigate effects of high
school curriculum on various student outcomes including academic performance at the university,
happiness, physical and mental health etc. Different from both papers that focus on direct effects
of this curriculum reform, this work shows that there exists an indirect effect on students’ decisions
of re-taking CEE, which affects their education outcome and even their capability subsequently in
the labor market.
More broadly, I also contribute to the literature that studies determinants of household edu-
cational investments. On one hand, levels of household educational expenditures are primarily
affected by household-level characteristics such as disposable income, parents’ education levels
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and their occupations. For example, [11] use Urban Household Survey data in 2007 and 2011 and
find that out-of-school education expenditure increased rapidly during this period while household
income and parents’ education levels are two key factors influencing intergenerational education
expenditure. On the other hand, changes in public policies would also affect household educational
investment. [52] document robust evidence that increases in public spending on basic education are
associated with significant reductions in household private tutoring spending in urban China. [39]
find that expansions of pension coverage in urban China cause significant increase in total educa-
tion investment in children. Similarly, this work analyzes how household educational investments
are affected using curriculum reform as an exogenous policy change.
Furthermore, this work also contributes to the literature on how education decisions are affected
by different levels of opportunity costs. In particular, [13] study how the reduction of changes in
the cost of migration affected the decision of middle school graduates to attend high school in rural
China and find a negative relationship between migrant opportunity and high school enrollment. In
addition, this work studies how changes in the cost of re-taking a high-stake examination is related
to the decision of household educational investment.
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2. RELOCATING MIGRANTS AND IN SITU MIGRANTS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON
URBANIZATION IN CHINA
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Rural-Urban Classification and the Urbanization Rate
The urbanization rate is the share of the population that resides in urban areas. It is also
justifies studying how rural and urban areas are classified in China. There are actually no universal
standards regarding the rural-urban dichotomy, and one country’s specific standard may also vary
over time. One traditional distinction between urban and rural areas is based on the assumption
that urban areas, no matter how they are defined, offer a different way of life and usually provide
a higher standard of living than rural areas (United Nations Statistics Division, 2017). According
to a 2012 UNICEF report, the dichotomy could be based on one or a combination of the following
standards: administrative criteria or political boundaries; a threshold population size1; population
density; and local economic industries/sectors or the presence of urban characteristics (e.g., paved
streets, electronic systems)2.
In China’s case, the official standard of rural-urban dichotomy changed with different waves of
population censuses. For example, in the fourth census wave in 1990, the rural-urban definitions
are purely administrative rather than indicative ([44]). For example, geographically, all “districts”
under province and prefecture level cities were classified as urban ([6]). The fifth wave of census in
2000 used a combination of standards for administrative criteria (in conjunction with three new el-
ements) to define urban areas: (a) whether or not an area has a population density of 1,500/squared
kilometer; (b) whether or not the local government is located in the area; (c) whether or not the
area is contiguous to an area where the local government is located3 ([6]). Compared with the
1In United States, for example, the Census Bureau identifies two types of urban areas: Urbanized Areas have 5,000
or more people while Urban Clusters have at least 2,500 and less than 5,000 people.
2The summary of these standards comes from The State of the World’s Children.
3The standard is Guidelines for Statistically Classifying Rural and Urban Areas (for Trial Implementation) which
was issued by the National Bureau of Statistics in 1999.
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previous standard, some towns or township areas that are in districts with less than 1,500 people/
square kilometer and that satisfy certain area contiguity criteria are classified as rural areas. Some
areas under townships that were previously defined as rural, however, would be considered urban
under this new standard if they meet certain conditions. [51] compares these statistical rules and
finds that a different method for calculating the total urban population using the aforementioned
two standards yields a very small change, only 0.16% of the 1990 and 2000 population censuses.
In 2008, the National Bureau of Statistics issued the current standard and announced that it
would also be used for the sixth census in 2010. The standard is based solely on land contiguity,
regardless of population densities, economic activities, or residential community infrastructures.
Hence, there is a possibility that a community is officially reclassified from rural to urban only be-
cause its attribute of land contiguity has been changed. One result of expanding urban areas is that
many rural residents are being redefined as urban. Different from migrants who actively relocate
themselves from rural to urban areas, these urbanized population never move. This contributes to
another part of urban population growth, in situ migrants.
2.1.2 In Situ Migrants
The main sources of urban population growth are natural growth, relocating migrants, and in
situ migrants.
The current literature (albeit limited) offers a couple of papers that focus on how each of those
sources contributes to China’s urban population growth. For example, using population census data
from the ten-year period of 1990 to 2000, [44] estimates that natural growth accounted for 17%
of the total urban population increase and relocating migrants accounted for 31%. The remaining
52% came from the establishment of new cities or towns or the expansion of current city or town
boundaries; this is contextually similar to the “in situ migrants".
Another related paper is [7], who employ census data and find that between 2000 and 2010, ur-
banization accounted for more than 80% of total urban population growth, more than half of which
was attributed to rural-urban migration. In the 2000s, around 40% of the total urban population
growth resulted from the land reclassification. Their approach of decomposing urban population
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growth can be summarized as follows. After net of natural population change, using census data
on total urban population in both waves, they first estimate the overall urbanized population in the
period, which accounts for both rural-urban migrants who have physically relocated (relocating
migrants) and those whose place of residence was reclassified as urban (in situ migrants) ([7]).
Second, they back out the flow of relocating migrants from census data which reflects population
stocks. More specifically, their accounting framework defines four states based on one’s residential
status (rural and urban) and Hukou status (agricultural and non-agricultural)4. By assuming that
those who live in rural areas always have agricultural Hukou in addition to some other assump-
tions, they break down rural-urban migrants into two components and calculate them separately:
changes in urban residents originally with non-local agricultural Hukou (net of natural growth) and
migrants who not only changed their Hukou status (agricultural to non-agricultural) but also change
their Hukou registration place, called YiDiNongZhuanFei in Chinese. After estimating the number
of relocating migrants, they back out the scale of urbanized population due to land reclassification
by subtracting relocating migrants from the overall urbanized population.
These papers shed light on the sources of urban population growth. However, they seldom re-
ceive attention, perhaps for the following reasons. First, they treat “in situ migrants” as a residual
term, not a direct measure. Put differently, they calculate the scale of in situ migrants after estimat-
ing the scale of relocating migrants and natural growth population; as a result, measurement errors
may arise if one wants to study the scale of in situ migrants. Second, their methods can only be
performed using two consecutive census waves to estimate the number for a nationwide 10-year
period. In addition, their approach often relies on strong assumptions. For example, in [7], they
assume those who live in urban areas and have agricultural Hukou in 2000 continue to live in urban
areas in 2010, which fails to consider the relatively large scale of return migrants.
In this current work, I propose an approach to directly and annually measure the scale of in
situ migrants at the prefecture level. The key to my method is using administrative codes and
rural-urban classification codes published by the National Bureau of Statistics.
4They further define urban residents with agricultural Hukou into those with non-local agricultural Hukou and local
agricultural Hukou.
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2.2 Decomposing Urban Population Growth
Based on the new rural-urban division standard, in 2009, the National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS) started annually publicizing the ID code for all communities and their corresponding rural-
urban division codes5. Figure 2.1 includes two screenshots from the NBS website: the upper panel
shows the links to information for all available years while the lower panel shows the content of
each observation unit. Each row represents a community. The first two columns contain commu-
nity ID and rural-urban division codes, respectively while the last column shows the community’s
name (in Chinese). I encode this information, track each community by its ID code year by year,
and identify those that have been reclassified from rural to urban during the period. I am then able
to measure the scale of in situ migrants resulting from community reclassification.
2.2.1 Community ID and Rural-Urban Division Codes
The twelve-digit community ID and the five-digit rural-urban division code have a combined
17 digits. The community ID consists of five administrative levels: the first two digits represent
province-level administrative units (provinces, autonomous regions and province-level municipal-
ities6), the next two digits for the prefecture and the fifth and sixth digits represent the county
(counties, county-level cities and districts)7. The seventh, eighth and ninth digits represent the
town while the final three digits represent the community8. They are codified according to the
NBS’ Coding Rules for Administrative Units at the Town Level and Lower9.
Regarding the rural-urban division code, the first two digits represent the village attributes and
the last three represent the rural-urban dichotomy. Only the last three digits for each community
are available (Note that there are only three digits in the second column of Figure 2.1’s lower
panel.); they are translated from the twelve-digit administrative code and the first two digits of the
5On average, number of communities have been declining in recent years. The number varies by year between
667,909 (in 2016) and 699,089 (in 2009).
6Province-level municipalities include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing.
7These three levels are codified by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, not by the National Bureau of Statistics.
8Towns and communities that have been confirmed by local governments would be codified from 001 to 399. Those
which have not been confirmed would be assigned codes from 400 to 599, indicating that they are virtual administrative
units (for example, industrial zones, farms and forestry stations).
9XianJi YiXia XingZheng QuHua Daima BianZhi Guize in Chinese.
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Figure 2.1: Screenshots of Community ID and Rural-Urban Division Codes
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rural-urban division code. In this three-digit code, the first digit represents the basic rural-urban
division10 while the remaining two provide a detailed sub-classification. Since my main focus is the
basic rural-urban dichotomy, I essentially rely on the first digit to distinguish urban communities
from rural villages.
2.2.2 Results from Tracking Community ID Over Time
One problem in identifying communities with rural-urban dichotomy changes is that the same
community’s community ID might vary across years. Due to the coding rule discussed above, any
change to the type of upper-level administrative units11 could result in changes to the community
ID. Moreover, it can also change when its (upper-level) administrative unit is reorganized12. Com-
munities with ID codes change account more than 5% every year. As a result, before I identify
those communities with rural-urban dichotomy change, I first need to track each community over
years. Otherwise, my results will be inaccurate if these communities are different in possibilities
of changing their rural-urban dichotomy.
I track community ID codes for all nearly 700,000 communities from 2009 to 2017. As shown
in Figure 2.1, for each community, I know its community ID and Chinese name. From the code,
I can extract information regarding all upper-level administrative units (e.g., province, prefecture,
county and town-level governments) it belongs to, beyond which I have no further information.
Since, I cannot obtain geographic locations (i.e., longitude and latitude) for each community, it
would be impossible for us to track communities due to merges and splits using my algorithm.
For example, Communities A and B merged as a new community. If the merged community in
the latter year shares the same community ID and name with one of these two communities, (e.g.,
A), then my tracking methods would track Community A in both years and leave B in the former
year unmatched. If the merged community in the latter year has a new code and name, then they
10“1" represents urban communities and “2" represents rural villages.
11For example, a county can be changed into a county-level city or district; a township can be changed into a town.
12For example, a county in one prefecture can be relegated to another prefecture. In 2011, Chaohu prefecture in the
province of Anhui had all its counties revoked. All of Chaohu’s counties were reassigned to three other prefectures in
the same province.
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would be left unmatched in both years13. Apart from that, my tracking algorithm works pretty
well in one-to-one community tracking in any two consecutive years. Put differently, almost all
communities that are left unmatched are outcomes due to merges and splits.
Another fact that is worth mentioning is the variable I choose as the identifier. First, community
name itself cannot work since there are multiple villages sharing the same Chinese name. Though
each name is unique within a town, there might be several villages with the same name across
towns in the same county. Second, community ID itself is not ideal as a single identifier, at least
in the first few steps. There is a possibility that Community A with an ID in the former year
is reassigned a new ID in the latter year while this new ID belonged to Community B in the
same town in the former year. For example, in 2009, under Pingzhuangcheng Street, Yuanbaoshan
District in Chifeng City, Inner Mongolia, the ID 150403002005 was assigned to Qianjin Road No.2
Community. In 2010, this ID was assigned to Fangzhi Road No.1 Community while that community
used to have another ID 150403002014 in 2009. Thus, in this case, if I use only the community
ID as the key variable, I could mistakenly track two different communities. As a result, using
only the twelve-digit community ID code as the key identifier would cause a mismatch problem,
even within the same town-level units, though this case is very rare in my dataset. In consequence,
in order to prevent such mismatch, I use both community ID and its name (in Chinese) as key
variables in my tracking algorithm.
Specifically, steps of my tracking algorithm are as follows and summarized in Table 2.1. After
each step, tracked communities are dropped and I would deal only with those left unmatched in
the next step, which would avoid the double counting problem.
Step 0: In this step, I track communities without code or name change using both variables as
the identifier, which account for the majority of all tracked communities.
Starting from Step 1, I begin dealing with communities whose upper-level administrative units
13Since I could not distinguish both cases, I am not aware of the share of each case. Nevertheless, I can take
the county-level administrative units merge as a reference. If the new county shares the same name with one of the
previous counties, then it will keep the corresponding ID (For example, in 2015, Jing’an District and Zhabei District
in Shanghai merged as a new district named Jing’an, then the new district kept the original Jing’an District ID code).
Otherwise, it would have a new code (for example, in 2016, Qinghe District and Qingpu District in Huai’an, Jiangsu
merged as a new district named Qingjiangpu, then the new district was assigned a new county-level ID code).
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Table 2.1: Description of Tracking Steps
Description of Algorithm Step Key Variables Used in Matching
Tracking with unchanged code and name 0 Community Code, Name
Tracking with changed code at the prefecture level 1 Manually
Tracking with changed code at the county level 2 Manually
Tracking with changed code at the town level
with: administrative type adjusted within county 3 Community Codea, Name
with: reassignment across counties within prefecture 4 Community Codea, Name
Tracking with changed code at the community level
with: no name change within town 5 Town Code, Name
with: no short name change within town 6 Town Code, Short Nameb
with: no name change across town within county 7 County Code, Name
with: no short name change across town within county 8 County Code, Short Name
with: first 2 characters of community name within town 9 Town Code, First 2 Characters
with: community code only 10 Community Code
a This is revised community code with substituting the 7th to 9th digits representing the town-level administrative unit
with the corresponding digits of the matched town-level units after matching with short names as identifiers.
b “Short Name” refers to community name dropping the characters indicating the type of the community. For example,
short name for Guanghua Village is Guanghua.
have been adjusted. As has been mentioned, since digits in the code represent a corresponding
level of administrative units, I will proceed from the highest level (province) to the lowest level
(town). For administrative changes at the provincial, city and county-level governments, I find
formal documentation on adjustment details from the website of the Ministry of Civil Affairs14.
First, I manually check changes at the province level. It turns out to be that in any two consecutive
years between 2009 and 2017, there are no administrative unit adjustment across provinces. Put
differently, no administrative units are reassigned to a different province. Thus, I start from the
prefecture level.
Step 1: In this step, I track communities with prefecture-level administrative units change,
which corresponds to the third and forth digits of the community ID. There are three reasons for
prefecture-level units adjustment: establish of new prefectures, abolishment of current prefectures
14The website is http://xzqh.mca.gov.cn/description?dcpid=1
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and changes of type of units15. For example, in 2011, Chaohu City in Anhui Province was re-
voked and its counties were assigned to three cities in the province. Examples of establishment
of new prefectures include Sansha and Danzhou City in Hainan province. Though, the majority
of administrative units change at the prefecture level takes the form of readjustment, with many
prefecture-level regions in Southwestern China areas or autonomous regions reclassified as cities
during this period. For all these three cases, I check communities under those changed prefectures
and manually do the one-to-one matching.
Step 2: In this step, I track communities with county-level administrative units change. Such
changes are shown from the fifth and sixth digits of the code. Similarly, most adjustments come
from changes of type of county-level administrative units16. In particular, many counties or county-
level cities are reclassified as districts. In addition to such reclassification, county-level units
merges and splits are also a key component for adjustments. I also check communities under
those changed counties and manually do the one-to-one matching.
The next two steps are associated with town-level ID code change. Since there are no detailed
formal documents on adjustments at the town level and lower, I mainly rely on adjustments due to
type changes of town-level administrative units.
Step 3: I first separate the characters indicating the type of the town-level units17 from its full
name and define what is left as its “short name”18. For town-level units that cannot be matched
using their full names within a county in two consecutive years, I match them using their short
names. Those matched samples may represent type adjustments19. Then I am able to track com-
munities under those towns using both the new code by changing the corresponding digits (seventh
15Types of prefecture-level administrative units include prefecture-level cities (Shi in Chinese), prefecture-level
regions (Diqu), autonomous prefectures (Zizhizhou) and leagues (Meng).
16Types of county-level administrative units include districts (Qu in Chinese), counties (Xian), county-level cities
(Xianjishi) and autonomous counties (Zizhixian), banners (Qi) and autonomous banners (Zizhiqi). The latter two are
particular for minority-grouped areas in Inner Mongolia.
17Types of town-level administrative units include towns (Zhen in Chinese), townships (Xiang), Streets (Jiedao)
and autonomous townships (Zizhixiang) and types indicating a particular use (e.g., prisons, farms, free trade zones,
industrial zones).
18For example, if the full name of a town-level administrative unit is Guanghua Township, I just keep Guanghua as
the short name.
19For example, if the Guanghua Township is reclassified as Guanghua Street in the next year, though I cannot match
these two units with their full name, I may achieve that result using the short-name matching.
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to ninth) in the community ID and community name as key variables.
Step 4: I follow similar procedures in Step 3, only allowing matching town-level units with
short name as identifier across county within the same prefecture in two consecutive years.
Beginning from Step 5, I track communities with code changes at the community level.
Step 5: Since the community name is uniquely identifiable within a town-level unit. In this
step, I track communities by using town-level ID code and community name as key variables,
which accounts for re-orderings for community lists within a town-level administrative unit.
Step 6: In this step, I use similar methods as I did for type adjustments at the town level. For all
unmatched communities, I construct their short names by dropping the characters indicating their
types20. I then match communities within town using their short names as key variables.
Step 7: This step follows Step 5, but using county-level ID code and community name as key
variables, allowing communities reassignment to another town-level unit within the same county.
Step 8: Similar to Step 7, this step follows Step 6, using county-level ID code and community
short name as key variables.
Step 9: In this step, I keep the first two characters of a community’s full name and use this as
the key identifier to track communities within town in two consecutive years. Though not as sharp
as Step 0-8, in most cases they are accurate.
Step 10: The final step uses community ID code only as the identifier for those unmatched
communities21. The reason that I would adopt this final step is because I observe that after previous
steps, most unmatched communities result from character changes in the name of the community.
Especially for communities in the minority-grouped regions, there exist changes in translating
community names from their own language to Mandarin Chinese.
My tracking algorithm allows me to track more than 99% of communities for two consecutive
years. Table 2.2 shows my tracking results using community administrative codes from 2009 to
20Types of community-level administrative units include communities (Shequ in Chinese), villages (Cun) and types
indicating a particular use.
21Before the last step, I would match communities with the same name within a town across year, so the aforemen-
tioned mismatch problem would be alleviated.
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201722. Overall, around 90% of communities could be tracked across all years.
2.2.3 Measuring the Overall Scale of in Situ Migrants
In Table 2.2, I have already shown my tracking results starting from 2009, the first year that
the National Bureau of Statistics publicized the rural-urban dichotomy information. As my study
period is 2010-2015, Table 2.11 summarizes the tracking results during this sub-period. I tracked
around 650,000 communities between 2010 and 2015. By analyzing each year’s rural-urban di-
vision code for those tracked communities, I am able to obtain detailed information on whether
each community has had a rural-urban dichotomy change and, if so, the year it was reclassified.
Table 2.11 summarizes this information. Of the 649,182 communities that were tracked during
this period, 27,795 were reclassified from rural to urban while 9,983 were reclassified from urban
to rural. The percentage of reclassified communities from rural to urban net of those reclassified
from urban to rural account for more than 3.7% of total rural communities in 201023.
One of the main focuses of this work is to measure the scale of in situ migrants between 2011
and 2015, which requires me to have information on the urban and rural population during this
period. The lower the level of administrative units from which I have population data, the more
accurate my measurements would be. Currently, I managed to gather data regarding urban and rural
population at the prefecture level. This data set comes from different sources. First, for the year
2010, I obtain this information for every prefecture-level city from the 2010 population census.
For the rest years (2011-2015), I look up urban population data for each prefecture either from its
provincial-level statistical yearbooks or from the prefecture’s statistical yearbooks or bulletins24.
In order to translate the number of reclassified communities into the scale of in situ migrants,
22Tables 2.3 to 2.10 show results for the mannual tracking steps for each two consecutive years.
23Here I assume that there are no systemic differences between communities reclassified from rural to urban and
those from urban to rural as the rural-urban dichotomy mainly relies on the contiguity rule discussed in Section
2.1.1, which can also be supported by descriptive evidence later shown in Section 2.3. In fact, many of communities
reclassified from urban to rural were either original rural villages that had been reclassified to urban before another
reclassification or urban communities that subsequently reclassified to urban again.
24While most provinces document the urban and rural population information each year in their statistical year-
books, some prefectures in provinces that do not have such information would publish this data in the prefecture-level
statistical yearbooks or announce it in the statistical bulletins. However, I fail to find this information in most prefec-
tures in provinces like Jilin, Heilongjiang, Tibet, Qinghai and Xinjiang.
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Table 2.3: Tracking Results for Communities between 2009 and 2010
Step Communities Reason for Adjustment Related Code (2009) Related Code (2010)
0 666,778
1 -
2 1,051
90 merge 110103 110101
107 merge 110104 110102
336 merge & establishment 120107, 120108, 120109 120116
52 abolishment 320304 320302, 320311, 320312
326 reclassification 320323 320312
39 establishment 360425, 360426, 360427 360482
101 reclassification 532522 532503
3 9,275
4 453
5 971
6 4,820
7 4,666
8 556
9 1,900
10 2,455
Total 692,925
Table 2.4: Tracking Results for Communities between 2010 and 2011
Step Communities Reason for Adjustment Related Code (2010) Related Code (2011)
0 648,805
1 6,463
1,018 abolishment 3414 3401, 3402, 3405
1,718 reclassification 5222 5206
3,727 reclassification 5224 5205
2 1,929
72 merge 310103 310101
65 reassignment 321003 321002
113 merge 321011 321003
333 reclassification 321088 321012
156 reclassification 430122 430112
439 merge & reclassification 500110, 500222 500110
312 merge & reclassification 500111, 500225 500111
237 reclassification 511522 511503
65 reclassification 530121 530114
137 reclassification 532621 532601
3 8,986
4 580
5 1,318
6 3,291
7 12,209
8 644
9 1,646
10 2,868
Total 688,739
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Table 2.5: Tracking Results for Communities between 2011 and 2012
Step Communities Reason for Adjustment Related Code (2011) Related Code (2012)
0 675,115
1 3
3 establishment 4690 4603
2 981
131 reclassification 130207, 130230 130209
269 merge & establishment 320502, 320503, 320504 320508
310 reclassification 320584 320509
26 merge 340502 340503
43 establishment 340521 340506
202 reclassification 511821 511803
3 4,327
4 199
5 1,029
6 2,026
7 4,640
8 861
9 929
10 1,412
Total 691,522
I need to obtain average population for those reclassified communities. This data comes from
the community survey in the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), conducted by the Survey
and Research Center for China Household Finance at Southwestern University of Finance and
Economics.
To date, there have been four CHFS waves: 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017. The first wave,
from summer 2011, covered 80 counties in 25 provinces and collected data from 8,438 households
across 320 community-level administrative units. The second wave in 2013 increased the sample
size to 28,143 households distributed in 1,048 communities across 29 provincial-level regions25.
The 2015 and 2017 waves consisted of 37,341 households from 1,373 communities and 40,011
households from 1,428 communities, respectively.
In CHFS data, communities are sampled using a stratified method with probability propor-
tionate to size sampling. All counties are divided into groups based on their respective GDP per
capita rankings; sampled counties are drawn from these groups. Sampled communities are then
25There are 31 provincial-level regions in mainland China. Tibet and Xinjiang are the only two that are not included
in this survey. (These two are Minority Autonomous Regions in Western China.)
26
Table 2.6: Tracking Results for Communities between 2012 and 2013
Step Communities Reason for Adjustment Related Code (2012) Related Code (2013)
0 661,722
1 1,648
1,648 reclassification 6321 6302
2 5,619
21 establishment 150781 150703
407 reclassification 220724 220781
58 merge 320103 320104
53 merge 320107 320106
120 reclassification 320124 320117
148 reclassification 320125 320118
319 reclassification 321284 321204
93 merge 370205 370203
1,023 merge 370284 370211
206 reclassification 441827 441803
526 reclassification 445121 445102, 445103
265 establishment 445202, 445221 445202, 445203
168 reclassification 450322 450312
57 merge 450404 450403
12 reassignment 450403 450421
79 establishment 450421 450406
116 establishment 450902 450903
282 establishment 511602 511603
849 reclassification 511721 511703
435 establishment 511902 511903
59 merge 520114, 520181 520111
75 establishment 520112 520115
140 reclassification 532526 532504
31 establishment 542430 542431
75 reclassification 632721 632701
2 establishment 652701 652702
3 6,257
4 246
5 733
6 3,621
7 6,161
8 275
9 1,864
10 2,795
Total 690,941
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Table 2.7: Tracking Results for Communities between 2013 and 2014
Step Communities Reason for Adjustment Related Code (2013) Related Code (2014)
0 639,153
1 2,514
492 reassignment 1306 1390
354 reassignment 1301 1390
1,668 reclassification 5423 5402
2 8,261
69 abolishment 130103 130102, 130104
173 reclassification 130124 130111
224 reclassification 130182 130109
215 reclassification 130185 130110
277 reclassification 220181 220113
196 merge 320705, 320706 320706
468 reclassification 320721 320707
401 reclassification 330621 330602, 330603
439 reclassification 330682 330604
330 reclassification 360782 360702, 360703
281 merge 370802 370811
437 reclassification 370882 370812
733 reclassification 371081 371002, 371003
990 reclassification 371421 371403
443 reclassification 371624 371603
375 reclassification 420321 420304
337 reclassification 440183 440118
265 reclassification 440184 440117
426 merge & reclassification 440903, 440923 440904
388 reclassification 441421 441403
142 reclassification 445302, 445323 445302, 445303
140 establishment 460201 460202 - 460205
326 reclassification 500224 500151
170 reclassification 500227 500120
16 establishment 632802 632857, 632858, 632859
3 6,964
4 487
5 525
6 1,875
7 4,486
8 343
9 839
10 1,153
Total 666,600
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Table 2.8: Tracking Results for Communities between 2014 and 2015
Step Communities Reason for Adjustment Related Code (2014) Related Code (2015)
0 638,107
1 1,860
1,142 reclassification 5421 5403
496 reclassification 5426 5404
222 reclassification 6521 6504
2 7,425
311 reclassification 120221 120117
418 reclassification 120223 120118
573 reclassification 130323 130302, 130304, 130306
221 merge & establishment 130603, 130604 130606
193 reclassification 130621 130607
272 reclassification 130622 130608
304 reclassification 130625 130609
330 reclassification 230182 230113
80 merge 320405, 320412 320402, 320404, 320411, 320412
109 reclassification 320482 320413
245 reclassification 320982 320904
305 reclassification 330183 330111
103 reclassification 330303, 330322 330305
217 reclassification 350784 350703
279 reclassification 350822 350803
338 reclassification 360122 360112
223 reclassification 361122 361103
345 reclassification 410224 410212
60 merge 440116 440112
352 reclassification 441283 441204
171 reclassification 441723 441704
218 reclassification 450122 450110
291 reclassification 451025 451081
303 reclassification 500223 500152
168 reclassification 500226 500153
108 reclassification 511422 511403
244 reclassification 513321 513301
146 reclassification 520421 520403
220 reclassification 530522 530581
64 reclassification 533421 533401
96 reclassification 610126 610117
118 reclassification 630221 630203
3 7,467
4 70
5 327
6 2,140
7 5,082
8 256
9 395
10 1,123
Total 664,252
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Table 2.9: Tracking Results for Communities between 2015 and 2016
Step Communities Reason for Adjustment Related Code (2015) Related Code (2016)
0 604,947
1 1,083
285 establishment 4690 4603
554 reclassification 5422 5405
244 reclassification 6522 6505
2 9,901
426 reclassification 110228 110118
422 reclassification 110229 110119
979 reclassification 120225 120119
300 merge 130721 130702, 130703, 130705
182 reclassification 130729 130708
214 reclassification 130733 130709
382 reclassification 131181 131103
232 reclassification 210122 210115
254 reclassification 210282 210214
167 reclassification 211121 211104
55 reclassification 230833 230883
122 reclassification 231024 231086
205 merge 310108 310106
340 reclassification 310230 310151
154 merge & establishment 320202, 320203, 320204 320213
118 merge & establishment 320802, 320811 320812
122 reclassification 320829 320813
40 merge & establishment 340702, 340703 340705
115 reclassification 340721 340706
257 reassignment 340823 340722
278 reassignment 341521 340422
82 reclassification 360402, 360427 360483
330 reclassification 370521 370505
367 reclassification 371727 371703
272 reclassification 411222 411203
147 reclassification 450221 450206
522 reclassification 500234 500154
282 reclassification 510122 510116
261 reclassification 510724 510705
853 reassignment 512081 510185
108 reclassification 513229 513201
267 reclassification 520303, 520321 520302, 520303, 520304
130 reclassification 530328 530303
72 reclassification 530421 530403
76 reclassification 533321 533301
34 reclassification 540125 540103
150 reclassification 610521 610503
217 reclassification 610624 610603
367 reclassification 610823 610803
3 6,066
4 32
5 447
6 8,682
7 4,306
8 2,876
9 2,162
10 2,226
Total 642,728
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Table 2.10: Tracking Results for Communities between 2016 and 2017
Step Communities Reason for Adjustment Related Code (2016) Related Code (2017)
0 637,228
1 890
890 reclassification 1390 1301, 1306
2 9,020
265 reclassification 130428 130407
410 reclassification 130429 130408
158 abolishment 130421 130402, 130471
109 reassignment 130427 130473
250 reclassification 130823 130881
316 reclassification 330185 330112
75 abolishment 330204 330212
398 reclassification 330283 330213
194 reassignment 330212 330203
319 reclassification 331021 331083
148 reclassification 360421 360404
294 reclassification 360721 360704
181 reclassification 361029 361003
910 reclassification 370181 370114
1,097 reclassification 370282 370215
70 abolishment 410211 410202
438 reclassification 411023 411003
271 reclassification 430124 430182
100 establishment 440306 440309
24 establishment 440307 440310
210 reclassification 451281 451203
343 reclassification 500228 500155
210 reclassification 500232 500156
207 reclassification 510124 510117
126 reclassification 510626 510604
413 reclassification 511028 511083
504 reclassification 520222 520281
136 reclassification 530122 530115
190 reclassification 610125 610118
313 reclassification 610721 610703
341 reclassification 610821 610882
3 6,722
4 302
5 477
6 2,436
7 2,722
8 227
9 921
10 2,056
Total 663,001
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Table 2.11: Results from Tracking Communities: 2010-2015
2010 2015
Number of Communities 695,924 668,389
Tracked Communities 649,182 649,182
Tracked Communities: Urban 168,576 186,388
Tracked Communities: Rural 480,606 462,794
Tracked Communities: Rural to Urban 27,795
Tracked Communities: Urban to Rural 9,983
Tracked Communities: Percentage of 2010 Rural 3.71%
Note: Data on number of communities is from the website of the National Bureau of Statis-
tics. See appendix for detailed description for our tracking strategy. Tracked communities
as a percentage of 2010 rural villages are calculated as (the number of tracked communities
from rural to urban - the number of tracked communities from urban to rural) / the number
of tracked rural communities in year 2010.
randomly drawn from those counties. The CHFS dataset is nationally representative panel data
which contains rich micro-level information on household demographics, balance sheets, income
and expenditures. Starting from the second wave in 2013, CHFS added a community-level sur-
vey for all sampled communities. This questionnaire included basic community demographic and
geographic information, public infrastructures, economy and local governance.
To calculate the average population for reclassified communities, I pool all three waves of
community survey and aggregate at both prefecture and province levels. I first show that my com-
munity samples are both representative at these two levels. In Figure 2.2, I show that information
regarding average population from the CHFS community survey is quite comparable with the cen-
sus data. The left panel shows this comparison at the province level. The horizontal axis shows
the average population of a rural community within a province calculated as the ratio between the
total rural population from 2010 Census and the total number of rural communities in 2010. The
vertical axis illustrates the average population from the pooled community survey aggregated at
each province. The correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.84 while the estimated
coefficient from a regression framework is 1.14, with the slope very close to a 45-degree line. The
right panel show this relationship at the prefecture level. I can calculate the average population
for all 339 prefectures from 2010 Census and 155 prefectures from pooled CHFS community sur-
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vey. The coefficient of correlation is 0.62. In addition, the estimated coefficient is 1.04, which is
significantly different from 0 but insignificantly different from 1, the slope of the 45-degree line.
As a result, I am confident that the survey data is representative, at least for the rural population
information at the prefecture level.
Figure 2.2: Population between CHFS Community Samples and 2010 Census
I then measure the average population for communities reclassified from rural to urban for each
prefecture between 2010 and 2015. First, I assume it is equal to the average population from re-
classified communities in the pooled CHFS community survey data (I have such information for 36
prefectures.). Since I do not have a large number of reclassified community samples in the CHFS
data set, for those prefectures without such information, the average population is then assumed
to be equal to the average rural population from the pooled CHFS community survey (I match
additional 121 prefectures.)26. Recall that I only have prefecture-level aggregated information for
26Later in Section 2.3, I would provide some descriptive evidence that the average number of population from re-
classified communities (both from rural to urban and from urban to rural) would be higher than the average population
in a rural community by less than around 10%. Therefore, I am likely to underestimate the average population from
these communities which lead to a lower bound of the measurement of the overall in situ migrants at the national level.
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less than half prefectures. For the rest, I set the average population for reclassified communities
equal to the province average27. Lastly, for the two province-level autonomous regions (Tibet and
Xinjiang) from which I have no observations, the average population from reclassified communi-
ties in a prefecture is assumed to be the average number of rural population in 2010 Census in that
prefecture also considering the natural growth from 2010 throughout 201528.
Then I am able to measure the scale of in situ migrants for each prefecture during 2010-2015,
which is just the number of communities reclassified from rural to urban net of those reclassified
from urban to rural multiplies the corresponding average population for these reclassified prefec-
tures rescaled by the ratio between average number of total communities to the number of tracked
communities during the period. Figure 2.3 illustrates the distributions of prefectures for both total
urban population growth and the share of in situ migrants between 2010 and 2015. Every prefec-
ture experienced positive total urban population growth. In terms of in situ migrants, however, I
find negative results in a few prefectures, which is a reason that number of communities reclassified
from urban to rural is greater than that from rural to urban. In terms of the distribution, I find that
most of the prefectures experience an in situ migration scale with around 200,000. I estimate the
overall scale of in situ migrants at the national level by summing this number across all prefectures.
Results show that from 2010 to 2015, there were approximately 33.65 million in situ migrants.
Next, I estimate the prefecture-level urban population growth resulting from natural birth and
death. For each prefecture, this number is equal to the difference between the 2010 rural population
and the overall prefecture-level in situ migrants times the overall natural growth rate in the corre-
sponding province during 2011-2015. I conclude that the natural growth of the urban population
was approximately 16.60 million.
Finally, Table 2.12 shows that the urban population increased by 101.38 million between 2010
27I use similar step-wise assumptions as I did at the prefecture level. For those unmatched prefectures, I first assume
the average population for reclassified communities is equal to the province average for reclassified communities (I
match 124 prefectures.) or rural communities (I match 36 prefectures.).
28Data about the natural growth rate is at the province-year level from the National Bureau of Statistics. I am not
able to find such information of rural population at the prefecture level. As a result, I need to make assumptions that
the variations of natural growth rate during 2010-2015 are not significantly different between rural and urban areas
across prefectures within the same province.
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Figure 2.3: Distributions for Urban Population Growth across Prefectures
and 2015. This total growth consists of natural growth, relocating migrants and the in situ mi-
grants. By subtracting the amount of natural growth and in situ migrants from the total, I estimate
that relocating migrants accounted for approximately 51.13 million, around 50.43% of total urban
population growth; in situ migrants accounting for around 33.19%, shown in Figure 2.4.
Table 2.12: Total Population and Urbanization Rate
Year Total Population Total Population: Urban Urbanization Rate
2011 1,347,350 690,790 51.27%
2012 1,354,040 711,820 52.57%
2013 1,360,720 731,110 53.73%
2014 1,367,820 749,160 54.77%
2015 1,374,620 771,160 56.10%
Note: Data is from the National Bureau of Statistics. The population number is measured
in thousands.
Comparing my result with the aforementioned two papers in this literature, it follows quite a
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Figure 2.4: Sources of Urban Population Growth (2010-2015)
similar trend since 199029. Though declining, this relatively large share indicates that urban area
expansions are still one of the main factors driving China’s increasing urbanization rate.
2.2.4 Comparing Results Using an Alternative Approach
Unlike [44] and [7] who back out the scale of rural-urban migration first and then take the
residual as urbanization by urban land extension or reclassification, my approach of decomposing
urban population growth takes the opposite direction. I first estimate the scale of in situ migrants
and then back out the relocating migrants as the residual term. In order to compare my approach
with theirs, especially [7] result that employs the most recent census waves, I adopt their method to
back out the scale of rural-urban relocating migrants as a robustness check using 2010 population
census and 2015 1% population mini-census. Recall that [7] break down rural-urban migrants into
two components: net changes in urban residents originally with non-local agricultural Hukou and
YiDiNongZhuanFei, summarized in Equation (10) from [7]:
P ∗12 + P
∗
14︸ ︷︷ ︸
rural-urban migration
= P 20102n − P 20002n − (b2n − d2n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
natural population change of
urban residents with non-local Hukou
+ P2n4 + P
∗
14︸ ︷︷ ︸
YiDiNongZhuanFei
(2.1)
29Recall that the share of in situ migrants to the overall urban population growth is 52% in 1990s [44]) and 40% in
2000s ([7]).
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where P 20102n −P 20002n − (b2n − d2n) is change of urban residents with non-local agricultural Hukou
net of natural growth.
I try to calculate these two components from the census data. First, I follow their approach
to find P t2n , the total number of urban residents with non-local agricultural Hukou. Since it is not
directly available from census data, they back it out using the following Equation:
P t2n = P
t
n ×
P t2n
P tn
(2.2)
where P tn represents the total number of urban residents with non-local Hukou, which is observ-
able in census while the latter term can be found in the Long Table, a subsample of census data.
However, in 2015 mini-census, I do not have Long Table questionnaire, so such information is not
directly accessible. I infer this ratio using 2000 and 2010 census data by linear interpolation, which
is approximately 54.7%30. In the 2015 mini-census, total number of urban residents with non-local
Hukou (P 2015n ) is 292.96 million. Thus, changes amount to
P 20152n −P 20102n = P 2015n ×
P 20152n
P 2015n
−P 2010n ×
P 20102n
P 2010n
= 292.96×54.7%−261.38×52.7% = 22.50 (2.3)
Moreover, I assume the natural population change as of total change is proportionately identical
between 2000-2010 and 2011-2015. By this assumption, the estimation of b2n − d2n is approxi-
mately 2.84 million. Hence, I can infer a net change of urban residents with non-local agricultural
Hukou during 2011-2015 of 19.66 million.
Second, I estimate the scale of YiDiNongZhuanFei from 2010 to 2015. Since the agricultural/non-
agricultural dual Hukou system was abolished in 2014, there was no information regarding number
of people with non-agricultural Hukou in the 2015 mini-census. Similarly, I approximate this ratio
in 2015 by linear interpolation, which is around 31.4%31.Thus, the population with non-agricultural
Hukou grew from 384.34 million in 2010 to 430.99 million in 2015. The estimated change of popu-
30This ratio is 48.8% and 52.7% in 2000 and 2010 respectively.
31This ratio is 24.7% and 29.1% in 2000 and 2010 respectively.
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lation with non-agricultural Hukou net of natural growth (NongZhuanFei) was 35.26 million, 45%
of which were YiDiNongZhuanFei, approximately 15.87 million.
By adding up these two components, the scale of rural-urban migrants using the approach
in [7] during 2010-2015 was 35.53 million. Subtracting these 35.53 million relocating migrants
and 18.16 million natural growth from the 101.38 million total urban population increase between
2010 and 2015, the estimated scale of in situ migrants was around 47.69 million, 42% larger than
the result from Section 2.2.3. As has been mentioned, my approach tends to be conservative and
is likely to underestimate the scale of in situ migrants. Also, in this alternative method, since
some information from the 2015 1% population mini-census is not available, I have to rely on
some linear estimation from its own tread, which is also likely to cause inaccurate measurements.
Nevertheless, since both approaches show that there are a large share of urban population growth
from urban area expansion (from 33% to 45%), I believe that exploring the characteristics of in
situ migrants living on those expanded urban areas are of importance to understand the overall
urbanization process for the recent decades in China.
2.3 Characteristics of in Situ Migrants
In Section 2.2, I estimate that in situ migrants accounted for more than 30% of total urban
population growth from 2010 to 2015. In this subsection, I use micro-level survey data from
CHFS to explore some characteristics of in situ migrants and the communities they live in.
2.3.1 Community- and Household-level Descriptive Evidence
I obtained three waves of the community survey and four waves of household survey from
CHFS; then I categorized these communities into four groups: rural, urban and those reclassified
from rural to urban from 2010 to the survey year32, those reclassified from urban to rural33.
Table 2.13 compares community characteristics for the 2013 wave. Of all 1,048 communities
surveyed in 2013, I can track 928 using their administrative code as the identifier; of these 505
32For example, if a community was reclassified from rural to urban in 2014, it was categorized as rural in the 2013
wave but as reclassified in the 2015 wave.
33Some communities experienced the rural-urban dichotomy switch more than twice during the study period. I do
not include those observations in the comparison as well as later in the empirical analysis.
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were urban, 388 were rural, 22 were communities reclassified from rural to urban (I refer to those
communities as reclassified communities for simplicity.), 11 were communities reclassified in the
opposite way and 1 community was reclassified more than once. In the community questionnaire,
I ask village leaders what type of community they consider their community to be. Results show
that the leadership of all 22 reclassified communities regarded themselves as rural, indicating that
they were unaware of their own community’s rural-urban dichotomy change. What’s more, in most
of the variables listed in the table, reclassified communities have more characteristics in common
with rural villages than their urban counterparts. For example, reclassified communities have an
average of 2,277 residents; this is close to the rural population average, and far below the urban
community average. Similarly, the average number of registered households in reclassified com-
munities is close to that of rural villages. The questionnaire also asked about basic local facilities,
such as number of banks. Data shows that both reclassified and rural communities have less than
one bank in their neighborhoods. Conversely, urban communities have more than two banks on av-
erage; this reflects that, in terms of the economic development and infrastructure, these reclassified
communities are far less developed than urban communities. Interestingly, all the characteristics
for communities reclassified from urban to rural are also very close to traditionally rural villages
and reclassified communities. This is straightforward in the sense that the current rural-urban di-
chotomy adopted by the National Bureau of Statistics is simply based on land contiguity, making
both directions of switches independent of the social and economic development of the community.
Beginning in 2015, more questions were added to the survey questionnaire regarding infras-
tructure and economic activities within a community. These new questions will help me make
comparisons in more aspects. Of the 1,257 samples from the 2015 wave shown in Table 2.14, 37
were reclassified from 2010 to 2015; of these, more than 70% regard themselves as rural rather
than urban. Demographically, these reclassified communities share similar characteristics with ru-
ral villages, such as the number of residents and also registered residents. Furthermore, 90% of
the population in reclassified communities has an agricultural Hukou. The ratio of communities
that own agricultural land is approximately 9% in urban communities but over 70% in reclassified
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Table 2.13: Community Comparisons for CHFS 2013
Urban Rural Rural to Urban Urban to Rural
Self-reported Rural 0.16 0.97 1.00 0.83
(0.37) (0.18) (0.00) (0.39)
Number of Residents 7,595.99 2,060.70 2,276.59 2,268.42
(7,061.90) (1,445.41) (1,080.74) (1,787.38)
Registered Households 2,375.17 511.07 567.32 637.83
(1,900.59) (333.15) (270.58) (480.16)
Number of Banks 2.28 0.51 0.55 0.58
(2.37) (0.98) (0.86) (1.08)
Poor Households 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.10
(0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.14)
Observations 505 388 22 12
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
communities; this indicates that the majority of households in these reclassified communities still
rely on agricultural activities. Additionally, these reclassified villages have significantly sparser
financial services, job training, and childcare and eldercare options than urban areas. Moreover,
the disposable per capital income for reclassified communities was less than 10,000 RMB, only
half of that of urban communities.
This phenomenon remained unchanged in the 2017 survey. Of all 1,310 communities in 2017,
42 were reclassified. For those communities reclassified between 2010 and 2017, they continued to
share common characteristics with traditional rural villages in most of my measures. For example,
in Table 2.15, more than 60% of these villages still self-reported as rural, almost 95% of residents
held agricultural Hukou and more than 80% had farmland. The average disposable income was
still far less than that of urban communities.
To compare the difference between reclassified communities from both their rural and urban
counterparts, I pool all three waves to increase the sample size. Table 2.16 presents the results.
Variables related to values are measured in 2015 CNY. In Column 5 I show the difference between
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Table 2.14: Community Comparisons for CHFS 2015
Urban Rural Rural to Urban Urban to Rural
Self-reported Rural 0.19 0.98 0.76 1.00
(0.39) (0.15) (0.43) (0.00)
Number of Residents 7,214.69 1,925.94 2,110.22 2,002.50
(7,151.95) (1,835.21) (1,489.81) (1,671.91)
Registered Residents 5,374.95 2,125.37 2,180.14 1,929.71
(5,226.85) (1,826.65) (1,338.65) (1,500.85)
Ag-Hukou Ratio 0.26 0.96 0.94 0.86
(0.41) (0.15) (0.15) (0.31)
Registered Households 2,250.38 557.68 672.58 638.50
(3,725.63) (433.81) (559.74) (426.91)
Agricultural Land 0.09 0.94 0.77 0.73
(0.28) (0.25) (0.44) (0.47)
Kindergarten 0.70 0.36 0.49 0.43
(0.46) (0.48) (0.51) (0.51)
Number of Banks 1.98 0.31 0.35 0.43
(2.35) (0.87) (0.75) (0.76)
Old-Care Service 0.48 0.16 0.22 0.43
(0.50) (0.37) (0.42) (0.51)
Job Training Service 0.24 0.07 0.14 0.21
(0.43) (0.25) (0.35) (0.43)
Disposable Income pc 17,730.16 6,967.72 8,230.83 20,298.14
(17,221.26) (6,576.80) (5,683.49) (29,994.51)
Poor Residents 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.17) (0.05)
Observations 676 524 37 14
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
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Table 2.15: Community Comparisons for CHFS 2017
Urban Rural Rural to Urban Urban to Rural
Self-reported Rural 0.15 0.96 0.62 0.93
(0.36) (0.19) (0.49) (0.26)
Number of Residents 7,186.88 1,911.69 2,070.29 1,836.60
(6,307.84) (2,026.00) (1,571.71) (1,439.96)
Registered Residents 5,189.84 2,040.96 2,044.90 1,847.00
(4,071.50) (1,543.53) (1,474.35) (1,430.95)
Ag-Hukou Ratio 0.25 0.95 0.93 0.86
(0.40) (0.16) (0.22) (0.35)
Registered Households 2,072.33 556.69 609.17 618.80
(1,838.89) (406.66) (528.80) (437.60)
Agricultural Land 0.15 0.92 0.82 0.77
(0.36) (0.28) (0.39) (0.44)
Kindergarten 0.70 0.38 0.50 0.40
(0.46) (0.49) (0.51) (0.51)
Number of Banks 1.80 0.33 0.57 0.73
(2.13) (1.28) (0.97) (1.62)
Old-Care Service 0.45 0.20 0.33 0.27
(0.50) (0.40) (0.48) (0.46)
Job Training Service 0.22 0.09 0.12 0.13
(0.41) (0.29) (0.33) (0.35)
Disposable Income pc 23,036.04 7,731.74 9,745.69 10,145.13
(45,279.23) (6,706.46) (7,895.18) (6,363.47)
Poor Residents 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02)
Observations 694 550 42 15
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
42
Table 2.16: Community Comparisons for Pooled Sample
Urban Rural Rural to Urban Urban to Rural (1)-(3) (2)-(3)
Self-reported Rural 0.17 0.97 0.75 0.93 -0.59∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.17) (0.43) (0.26) (0.04) (0.02)
Number of Residents 7,307.78 1,956.30 2,129.85 2,019.63 5,177.93∗∗∗ -173.55
(6,824.02) (1,818.16) (1,436.49) (1,594.98) (679.99) (184.80)
Registered Residents 5,280.86 2,082.14 2,107.32 1,886.93 3,173.54∗∗∗ -25.18
(4,674.56) (1,687.33) (1,405.91) (1,439.24) (530.85) (195.84)
Ag-Hukou Ratio 0.26 0.95 0.94 0.86 -0.68∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.40) (0.16) (0.19) (0.33) (0.05) (0.02)
Registered Households 2,218.62 544.92 622.79 631.10 1,595.83∗∗∗ -77.87∗
(2,686.86) (399.12) (493.73) (435.60) (268.99) (41.95)
Agricultural Land 0.17 0.94 0.87 0.82 -0.70∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.23) (0.34) (0.39) (0.05) (0.03)
Kindergarten 0.70 0.37 0.49 0.41 0.21∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.46) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.05) (0.06)
Number of Banks 1.99 0.37 0.49 0.59 1.51∗∗∗ -0.11
(2.28) (1.07) (0.87) (1.20) (0.23) (0.11)
Old-Care Service 0.47 0.18 0.28 0.34 0.19∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗
(0.50) (0.39) (0.45) (0.48) (0.06) (0.05)
Job Training Service 0.23 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.10∗∗ -0.05
(0.42) (0.27) (0.33) (0.38) (0.05) (0.03)
Disposable Income pc 19,234.17 6,645.82 8,104.43 12,887.85 11,129.74∗∗∗ -1,458.61∗∗
(32,388.26) (6,068.18) (6,270.48) (18,886.43) (3,244.04) (628.80)
Poor Residents 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.05 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 1875 1462 101 41
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
urban and reclassified communities. In all characteristics, the differences are not only large in
magnitude but also highly significant different from zero, all at 1% level. In contrast, Column 6
shows that between rural villages and reclassified communities. While the differences are smaller,
most of them are indistinguishable from zero. From such simple comparison, it is clear to see that
although reclassified as urban, those commmunities are more aligned with their rural counterparts
in terms of demographic and economic development.
In addition to community-level comparisons, I also use household survey data to explore
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Table 2.17: Household Comparisons for CHFS 2011
Urban Rural Rural to Urban Urban to Rural
Family Size 3.21 3.98 3.95 2.83
(1.39) (1.72) (1.62) (1.26)
Number of Children 0.53 0.77 0.61 0.30
(0.69) (0.93) (0.84) (0.56)
Head Schooling 10.56 6.76 6.60 8.51
(3.90) (3.46) (3.52) (4.34)
Head Urban Hukou 0.69 0.03 0.02 0.85
(0.46) (0.16) (0.14) (0.36)
Ag Activity 0.13 0.82 0.88 0.00
(0.34) (0.39) (0.33) (0.00)
Agricultural Land 0.22 0.89 0.96 0.07
(0.42) (0.32) (0.20) (0.27)
Total Income 65,174.46 26,701.83 27,423.48 29,278.56
(140,145.31) (134,420.56) (27,167.06) (25,316.41)
Total Consumption 49,783.60 24,138.83 19,732.86 22,851.19
(108,396.96) (45,063.22) (21,338.86) (15,136.80)
Observations 4958 2459 100 40
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
whether significant demographic differences exist at the household level. Table 2.17 shows the
demographic and economic information of households in different categories of communities from
the 2011 wave. Of the total 7,557 households from which I have detailed information, 100 are from
reclassified communities. Similar to what I find with community-level data, households living in
reclassified communities share more common characteristics with rural households. For example,
compared with urban households, they have larger household sizes, more children, and less years
of schooling. They are also more likely to hold a rural Hukou while working in the agricultural
sector. With respect to economic activity, their incomes and consumption levels are much lower.
The following waves have larger samples. I identified 463, 825 and 969 households from
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Table 2.18: Household Comparisons for CHFS 2013
Urban Rural Rural to Urban Urban to Rural
Family Size 3.19 4.05 4.02 3.64
(1.42) (1.88) (1.87) (1.53)
Number of Children 0.49 0.76 0.75 0.55
(0.70) (1.00) (0.90) (0.67)
Head Schooling 10.55 6.84 7.25 7.76
(4.04) (3.50) (3.50) (3.08)
Head Urban Hukou 0.68 0.03 0.04 0.13
(0.47) (0.17) (0.19) (0.34)
Ag Activity 0.10 0.73 0.69 0.56
(0.30) (0.45) (0.46) (0.50)
Agricultural Land 0.21 0.80 0.81 0.66
(0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.48)
Total Income 80,292.60 35,927.02 45,131.39 39,209.15
(212,872.84) (104,699.64) (97,593.95) (49,702.95)
Total Consumption 57,874.10 35,064.97 39,381.68 36,619.71
(66,336.46) (41,180.66) (44,921.47) (32,050.64)
Observations 16999 8123 463 293
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
communities reclassified from rural to urban in 2013, 2015 and 2017 wave, respectively, and the
results were in line with what I found using the 2011 wave, both in terms of demographic and
economic conditions shown in Table 2.18, 2.19 and 2.20.
In addition, Table 2.21 compares the difference for household characteristics pooling samples
from all four waves. Similar to what I find from the community-level observations, in the house-
hold data, I still find large and significant difference between urban households and those from
reclassified communities while this difference is much larger than that between rural and reclassi-
fied communities.
Using descriptive evidence from both community and household-level comparisons, I conclude
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Table 2.19: Household Comparisons for CHFS 2015
Urban Rural Rural to Urban Urban to Rural
Family Size 3.14 3.78 3.88 3.52
(1.43) (1.84) (1.80) (1.57)
Number of Children 0.47 0.67 0.69 0.50
(0.69) (0.95) (0.87) (0.68)
Head Schooling 10.37 6.88 7.18 7.59
(4.07) (3.46) (3.57) (2.87)
Head Urban Hukou 0.65 0.03 0.06 0.04
(0.48) (0.17) (0.24) (0.19)
Ag Activity 0.12 0.74 0.59 0.67
(0.33) (0.44) (0.49) (0.47)
Agricultural Land 0.24 0.89 0.77 0.81
(0.43) (0.31) (0.42) (0.40)
Total Income 98,828.93 44,847.91 52,322.53 49,098.03
(734,014.00) (267,614.44) (132,083.67) (132,610.70)
Total Consumption 66,831.60 37,144.16 49,047.86 49,714.57
(79,987.78) (49,554.05) (86,940.28) (70,898.66)
Observations 22442 10513 825 349
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
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Table 2.20: Household Comparisons for CHFS 2017
Urban Rural Rural to Urban Urban to Rural
Family Size 2.97 3.55 3.59 3.35
(1.39) (1.77) (1.80) (1.64)
Number of Children 0.43 0.62 0.65 0.51
(0.69) (0.92) (0.93) (0.74)
Head Schooling 10.46 6.96 7.12 7.08
(3.97) (3.46) (3.69) (3.36)
Head Urban Hukou 0.60 0.03 0.07 0.06
(0.49) (0.18) (0.25) (0.24)
Ag Activity 0.12 0.75 0.56 0.70
(0.32) (0.43) (0.50) (0.46)
Agricultural Land 0.18 0.80 0.66 0.71
(0.39) (0.40) (0.47) (0.46)
Total Income 98,468.22 45,227.48 50,811.92 56,815.12
(121,807.79) (73,563.44) (70,419.81) (86,970.08)
Total Consumption 67,704.29 37,091.12 44,290.51 41,214.59
(58,118.76) (38,198.78) (43,928.98) (42,938.89)
Observations 23912 11425 969 394
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
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Table 2.21: Household Comparisons for Pooled Sample
Urban Rural Rural to Urban Urban to Rural (1)-(3) (2)-(3)
Family Size 3.10 3.78 3.79 3.46 -0.69∗∗∗ -0.01
(1.41) (1.83) (1.81) (1.58) (0.03) (0.04)
Number of Children 0.46 0.68 0.68 0.51 -0.22∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.69) (0.95) (0.90) (0.69) (0.01) (0.02)
Head Schooling 10.46 6.89 7.15 7.48 3.32∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(4.02) (3.47) (3.60) (3.19) (0.08) (0.07)
Head Urban Hukou 0.64 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.58∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.48) (0.17) (0.23) (0.30) (0.01) (0.00)
Ag Activity 0.11 0.75 0.61 0.63 -0.50∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.44) (0.49) (0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Agricultural Land 0.21 0.84 0.74 0.70 -0.53∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.37) (0.44) (0.46) (0.01) (0.01)
Total Income 90,373.77 40,786.01 48,339.45 47,617.83 42,034.32∗∗∗ -7,553.44∗∗
(441,480.46) (170,892.02) (99,504.37) (94,564.54) (9,101.54) (3,563.01)
Total Consumption 62,821.37 35,157.36 43,161.16 41,425.77 19,660.21∗∗∗ -8,003.80∗∗∗
(72,486.90) (43,216.13) (61,805.14) (50,695.26) (1,511.69) (953.84)
Observations 68287 32520 2357 1076
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
that the modernization process is still less developed for these reclassified communities, regardless
of the community’s infrastructure, economic activities, or income levels. Although statistically
treated as urban, reclassified communities are much more similar to rural villages.
2.3.2 Community Reclassification and Housing Behaviors
Aimed to solve the urban high-vacancy-rate puzzle, it is of both interest and importance to test
empirically whether reclassification from rural to urban had impacts on homeownership and other
housing measures for households in those reclassified communities. In order to do this, I pool
all four waves of household-level survey data and adopt a fixed-effects model, with the following
regression equation:
yijt = αj + ρt + βReclassificationjt +X
′
ijtγ + ijt (2.4)
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where i denotes household, j denotes community and t denotes the survey year. The outcome
variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the household is a homeowner. I also explore
the effects of reclassification on multiple homeownership, measured by the number of housing
units each household owns. αj and ρt are community and year (survey wave) fixed effects.
Reclassificationjt is the key variable of interest, which is a dummy variable equal to one if
Community j has been reclassified from rural to urban by year t. Xijt is a vector a household-level
control variables including household size, age of household head, whether the household head is
married, number of children and elderly within the household and whether household has agricul-
tural land. Summary statistics is presented in Table 2.22. Since I am comparing households in
traditional rural villages and reclassified communities, I drop observations from urban communi-
ties as well as communities reclassified from urban to rural. Standard errors are clustered at the
community level.
Since I am exploit the within-community variation in reclassification to distinguish its effect
from confounding factors, I am in a difference-in-differences framework. Thus, my identifying
assumption would be that in the absence of the reclassification, reclassified communities would
have experienced changes in homeownership and other behaviors regarding living conditions and
housing demand similar to non-reclassified villages.
One may wonder whether those reclassified communities shared different attributes from tra-
ditional rural villages even before they were reclassified, which could cause concerns in my iden-
tification strategy. My data allows me to test and relax this identifying assumption in several ways.
First, I offer a formal statistical test by including an indicator for the two years prior to the reclassi-
fication in Equation 2.4. That is, I ask whether reclassified villages diverged in terms of household
homeownership even before reclassification. If they do, it suggests that the identifying assumption
of my research design is violated. Second, as has been discussed in previous subsections, the cur-
rent standard of rural-urban dichotomy is simply based on land contiguity, independent of the social
and economic development of the community. I can empirically test this by taking advantage of
my community-level survey panel data. To be more specific, I use community-level demographic
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Table 2.22: Housing Comparisons for Pooled Sample
Urban Rural Rural to Urban Urban to Rural
Willing to Buy 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.09
(0.36) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Willing to Build 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.08
(0.18) (0.31) (0.30) (0.27)
Live in Own House 0.78 0.95 0.91 0.90
(0.41) (0.23) (0.28) (0.31)
Have Own House 0.87 0.96 0.94 0.93
(0.33) (0.19) (0.23) (0.25)
Housing Usable Size 96.94 126.86 138.72 121.19
(81.13) (94.91) (101.17) (93.09)
Self-Built House 0.30 0.87 0.86 0.71
(0.46) (0.34) (0.35) (0.45)
Collective-Owned Land 0.15 0.48 0.58 0.49
(0.36) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Housing Cost 189,740.68 63,376.50 82,744.14 65,611.57
(380,473.69) (120,495.65) (153,465.42) (113,515.44)
Housing Fair Value 778,791.16 146,127.94 290,012.42 175,446.81
(1,342,186.87) (833,538.40) (2,139,777.83) (331,484.54)
Observations 68282 32520 2357 1076
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
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and economic variables to predict whether this village would be reclassified within the next survey
period (i.e., two years). The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if a village that had
never been reclassified was reclassified within the next survey period34. Results are shown in Table
2.23. Column 1 only includes geographic, demographic variables and those proxy for economic
development, which could have explanatory power for household homeownership and housing be-
haviors. The overall R-squared is low (only 0.008) and I fail to reject the hypothesis of the overall
insignificance using the joint F-test, though some variables are statistically significant. This signif-
icance disappears in specifications which I gradually include county-level fixed effects, year fixed
effects and their interaction terms. Across all specifications, the F-statistics are insignificant. As a
result, I am assured that observable community-level characteristics that ought to reflect the social
and economic development of a community are not correlated with its reclassification status.
Results from Equation 2.4 using homeownership dummy and number of housing units are
shown in Table 2.24 and 2.25. Column 1 only includes community fixed effects and year fixed
effects while Column 2 includes additionally household-level covariates to increase precision. Re-
sults remain unchanged with the coefficients or reclassification dummy both economically and
statistically insignificant, indicating that the community reclassification from rural to urban does
not have any impacts on household-level homeownership and multiple homeownership. The third
column shows that the estimated coefficients remain small in magnitude and insignificance to re-
placing community fixed effects with household fixed effects. To further mitigate the concern for
my identification strategy due to the possibility of differential time trends that would be corre-
lated with the timing of reclassification, in columns 4 and 5, I show that the results are robust to
controlling for specific time trends more flexibly. In Column 4, I allow communities in different
provinces to have different time trends by including province-year fixed effects while Column 5
adopts interact all household-level characteristics with each year fixed effect. My main results for
both outcome measures remain economically small and statistically insignificant after introducing
34Since the first community-level survey was conducted in 2013, I drop communities that had been reclassified
before the year 2013 since I do not have any pre-period information on them. I also drop observations from the 2017
survey since I do not know their rural-urban dichotomy after 2017.
51
Table 2.23: Balanced Test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Area) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Number of Roads -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014)
Agricultural Land 0.012∗∗ -0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Ln(Residents) 0.016∗∗ 0.011 0.014 0.020
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017)
Ln(Households) -0.019∗∗ -0.005 -0.008 -0.010
(0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021)
Ln(Migrants) -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Poor Residents 0.008 -0.006 0.010 0.040
(0.039) (0.057) (0.057) (0.076)
Ln(Household Income) 0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
County FE No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
County*Year FE No No No Yes
R2 0.008 0.519 0.520 0.612
Observations 813 813 813 813
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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several additional controls for differential time trends.
In Table 2.26, I show results including the dummy variable for the two years prior to the
reclassification. Adding this indicator makes the omitted category to three or more years prior to
treatment, which alters the interpretation of the reclassification dummy. However, the fact that both
indicators are small and insignificant reflects that these two reclassified community follow similar
trend with rural villages in terms of homeownership before and even after reclassification.
One may worry that the control group in my empirical model might not approximate the treat-
ment group well if they fall into different regions of the country. I address this concern in two way.
At the macro level, Figure 2.5 shows the regional distribution of the overall ratio of reclassified
communities across provinces during the period 2009 throughout 2017. Though provinces along
the coastal areas show somehow larger reclassification rate, provinces with the highest rates are
in the central and western areas. Furthermore, neighbouring provinces with similar levels of eco-
nomic development may show different reclassification behaviors. For example, Shaanxi Province
is among the highest reclassification rate, while Shanxi Province, which is to the east of Shaanxi
shows the lowest rate of reclassification, although both provinces share similar tradition and culture
with similar economic development. Second, at the micro level, in Table 2.27, I show the base-
line results are robust if I drop the observations from provinces that do not have any reclassified
community.
Another potential issue of concern is attrition from the CHFS survey. In Table 2.28, I run the
basic regression used to identify the role of reclassification on homeownership, equation 2.4, on
attrition. The effect of reclassification on attrition is both small and statistically insignificant. There
is therefore no evidence that reclassification would cause different behaviors in terms of attrition
from the sample or household moving out of the community.
The rich information on housing from CHFS household survey questionnaire also allows me
to empirically test the reclassification impacts on other housing measures. Table 2.29 shows cor-
responding results. Samples are restricted to households owning at least one housing unit. In
Column 1, I regress number of rooms for the current housing unit they live in on the reclassifi-
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Table 2.24: Effects of Village Reclassification: Homeownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reclassified -0.015 -0.015 -0.034 -0.017 -0.015
(0.060) (0.060) (0.063) (0.057) (0.059)
Family Size 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Female Head 0.004 0.003 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014)
Head Age -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head Schooling 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Number of Children -0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Number of Elderly -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Married 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
Agricutural Land 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Community FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE No No Yes No No
Province*Year FE No No No Yes No
Household Characteristics*Year Effects No No No No Yes
R2 0.058 0.093 0.003 0.097 0.094
Observations 34876 34789 34876 34789 34789
Robust standard errors are clustered at the community level.
R-squred reported in the specification with household fixed effects is the within R-suqred.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.25: Effects of Village Reclassification: Multiple Homeownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reclassified -0.042 -0.043 -0.040 -0.038 -0.043
(0.086) (0.086) (0.097) (0.086) (0.085)
Family Size 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Female Head 0.017∗ 0.017∗ 0.023
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019)
Head Age 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Head Schooling 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of Children -0.039∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
Number of Elderly -0.039∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012)
Married 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019)
Agricutural Land 0.050∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014)
Community FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE No No Yes No No
Province*Year FE No No No Yes No
Household Characteristics*Year Effects No No No No Yes
R2 0.064 0.109 0.001 0.113 0.111
Observations 32706 32622 32706 32622 32622
Robust standard errors are clustered at the community level.
R-squred reported in the specification with household fixed effects is the within R-suqred.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.26: Effects of Village Reclassification: Add Pre-Treatment Indicator
Homeownership Multiple Homeownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reclassified -0.010 -0.006 0.029 0.039
(0.037) (0.036) (0.053) (0.053)
1-2 Years Before 0.007 0.012 0.097 0.112
(0.044) (0.043) (0.080) (0.079)
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics No Yes No Yes
R2 0.058 0.093 0.064 0.109
Observations 34876 34789 32706 32622
Robust standard errors are clustered at the community level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
cation dummy variable, controlling for household-level characteristics, community fixed effects
and year fixed effects. The coefficient of reclassification indicator is around 0.4 and insignificant.
Next, I use logarithm of housing size as dependent variable in Column 2, the coefficient estimate is
negative and also insignificant, indicating that community reclassification does not to improve the
quantity of housing consumption. One character of housing behavior in rural China is that house-
holds often build their houses on assigned land (ZhaiJiDi) rather than purchase from the housing
markets. In Column 3, I find that the coefficient is around 0 in magnitude.
Starting with the third wave in 2015, the questionnaire also included questions regarding hous-
ing demand. From both waves in 2015 and 2017, I distinguished their demand as either self-built
or purchasing from housing markets. In 2015, the ratio of households that are willing to improve
their living conditions by having more houses was similar in all three categories (rural, urban and
reclassified), around 20%. While most urban residents would prefer to purchase apartments, more
than half of reclassified villages would like to build housing units themselves. This trend was still
obvious in the 2017 wave; this indicates that although noticeable housing demands exist, the major-
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Table 2.27: Effects of Village Reclassification: Drop Provinces w/o Reclassified Villages
Homeownership Multiple Homeownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reclassified -0.016 -0.016 -0.048 -0.049
(0.060) (0.060) (0.086) (0.087)
Family Size 0.019∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003)
Female Head 0.008 0.023∗∗
(0.005) (0.011)
Head Age -0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Head Schooling 0.001 0.008∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
Number of Children -0.017∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005)
Number of Elderly -0.018∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005)
Married 0.034∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗
(0.007) (0.011)
Agricutural Land 0.037∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009)
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.061 0.096 0.061 0.111
Observations 27294 27223 25424 25355
Robust standard errors are clustered at the community level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.28: Effects of Village Reclassification: Attrition from Survey
(1) (2) (3)
Reclassified -0.048 -0.049 0.008
(0.232) (0.234) (0.007)
Family Size -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002)
Female Head 0.010
(0.007)
Head Age -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Head Schooling -0.001∗
(0.001)
Number of Children 0.001
(0.003)
Number of Elderly 0.002
(0.003)
Married -0.049∗∗∗
(0.007)
Agricutural Land -0.016∗∗∗
(0.006)
Community FE Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Household FE No No Yes
R2 0.360 0.363 0.080
Observations 21393 21364 21393
Robust standard errors are clustered at the community level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.29: Effects of Village Reclassification: Alternative Housing Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No.Room Ln(Size) Self-Built Willing to Buy
Reclassified 0.400 -0.030 -0.000 -0.054
(0.556) (0.030) (0.037) (0.033)
Family Size 0.466∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Female Head -0.303 0.022 -0.004 0.006
(0.377) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007)
Head Age 0.093 -0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Head Schooling -0.122 0.009∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Children 0.188 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of Elderly -0.198 -0.038∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.012∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Married 2.748 0.138∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ -0.002
(2.513) (0.017) (0.008) (0.006)
Agricutural Land 0.057 0.037∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.090) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007)
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.027 0.225 0.154 0.089
Observations 31823 30632 31875 17244
Robust standard errors are clustered at the community level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.5: Geographic Distribution of the Reclassified Communities
ity of households from reclassified communities still prefer to build houses rather than participate
in the local housing market. In Column 4 of Table 2.29, I show that households in reclassified
communities are no more willing to participate in more formal housing markets; i.e., they are no
more involved in purchasing a unit compared with households in rural villages.
2.3.3 Community Reclassification and Household Welfare
In the previous subsection, I fail to find any effects of community reclassification from rural
to urban on any improvement on household housing behavior. Nevertheless, households living in
those communities are never regarded as rural citizens in any statistical way. I am interested in the
question that in what aspects the reclassification affects households within the community. Did it
affect household-level income and consumption that might not be revealed from housing behavior?
If this urbanization lead to more local job opportunities, then this could translate to more welfare
gain. To investigate this, I use the household-level survey in all four waves of CHFS. Each survey
has a detailed income and consumption module that allows for calculation of different sources of
income and consumption. Regression results using them as dependent variables are shown in Table
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2.30.
In Column 1, I regress the logarithm of household income per capita on the reclassification
indicator, household-level covariates as well as the community fixed effects and year fixed effects.
Though the coefficient estimates of the reclassification dummy is positive with 0.109 in magnitude,
it is not statistically different from zero. In addition, I do not observe a statistically significant effect
on overall consumption as well as consumption of non-food items. All results combined, I fail to
detect any effect of the community reclassification on improving welfare for the local households.
2.3.4 Long-Run Reclassification Effects
One may think that after being reclassified as urban, those communities would follow a differ-
ential development trajectory than their rural counterparts. For example, reclassified communities
might experience more investments in the infrastructures from upper-level governments, which
might take years. Thus, it is also important to discover whether there exists any long-run reclassi-
fication effects for the reclassified villages.
In Table 2.31, we show household characteristics in both rural villages and communities reclas-
sified from rural to urban across years. As the first year we can identify reclassified communities
is 2010 and our last wave of survey measures household behaviors in 2017, it has been at least six
years for the first cohort of communities since reclassification. However, we fail to discover any
noticable differences in all household-level characteristics.
In terms of housing behavior, Figure 2.6 shows the dynamic reclassification effects on house-
hold homeownership and multiple homeownership from a regression framework. The outcome
variable is either the homeownership dummy or number of housing units. The key explanatory
variables are a series of indicators for 1 or 2 years before reclassification, the year of reclassifi-
cation, 1 or 2 years after reclassification and 3 or more years after reclassification. The omitted
category is 3 or more years before reclassification. We also include community and year fixed
effects. The red dots indicate the coefficients of estimate while the 95 percent confidence intervals
are indicated by lines. In line with the descriptive evidence, we fail to find any long-run effects of
reclassification on household housing behaviors.
61
Table 2.30: Effects of Village Reclassification: Welfare
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Income pc) Ln(Consumption pc) Ln(Non-Food Consumption pc)
Reclassified 0.109 0.009 -0.046
(0.103) (0.075) (0.102)
Female Head -0.003 0.041∗∗ 0.032
(0.026) (0.016) (0.020)
Head Age -0.006∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head Schooling 0.047∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of Children -0.134∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of Elderly -0.164∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Married 0.065∗∗ -0.007 0.099∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.017) (0.020)
Agricutural Land 0.143∗∗∗ -0.004 0.057∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.013) (0.017)
Community FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.184 0.219 0.185
Observations 33627 34786 34682
Robust standard errors are clustered at the community level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.31: Household Comparisons for CHFS 2017
Rural 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Family Size 3.55 3.92 3.53 3.84 3.80 4.11 3.29 3.23 2.90
(1.77) (1.92) (1.86) (1.77) (1.76) (1.88) (1.51) (1.70) (1.37)
Number of Children 0.62 0.85 0.64 0.76 0.78 0.89 0.41 0.48 0.30
(0.92) (0.97) (0.94) (0.97) (0.98) (1.16) (0.64) (0.76) (0.69)
Head Schooling 6.96 7.50 7.09 7.36 7.62 4.88 7.78 7.40 6.75
(3.46) (3.46) (3.66) (3.25) (3.40) (4.33) (3.68) (3.55) (4.11)
Head Urban Hukou 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.31
(0.18) (0.27) (0.19) (0.21) (0.17) (0.21) (0.00) (0.18) (0.46)
Ag Activity 0.75 0.58 0.70 0.55 0.65 0.13 0.44 0.39 0.54
(0.43) (0.49) (0.46) (0.50) (0.48) (0.33) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Agricultural Land 0.80 0.59 0.79 0.64 0.69 0.41 0.65 0.58 0.56
(0.40) (0.49) (0.41) (0.48) (0.47) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
Total Income 45,227.48 49,469.86 41,368.92 63,153.77 45,783.76 35,410.72 78,264.57 45,560.84 60,679.98
(73,563.44) (59,060.08) (56,717.22) (93,987.32) (90,011.87) (33,782.32) (93,935.51) (61,929.20) (64,604.45)
Total Consumption 37,091.12 44,165.32 32,322.48 58,397.08 61,332.89 58,984.09 54,761.42 37,124.31 38,896.41
(38,198.78) (42,957.02) (31,324.77) (50,308.48) (71,967.49) (37,473.43) (51,325.93) (41,200.22) (30,678.66)
Observations 11425 142 325 135 65 64 85 62 91
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
To summarize, I first descriptively demonstrate that reclassified communities are different from
urban communities not only in community characteristics but also in household housing behaviors
and demand. In all of these aspects, reclassified areas are identical to rural villages. In addition to
this cross-sectional comparison, I empirically show that being reclassified does not have impacts
on the development trajectory for the corresponding communities; they still followed the trend that
resembles rural villages. Both horizontally and vertically, I fail to detect any difference between
reclassified and rural villages.
2.4 In Situ Migrants and Housing Markets
2.4.1 Urban Population as a Determinant of Land Supply
In China, according to the Constitution under the “Two-Tier Land Tenure System”, urban land
is owned by the state, and rural land is owned by local collective communes ([33]). In fact, local
governments have de facto control over city planning and land use. As a result, the fundamental
restriction on China’s housing supply is that the land supply is controlled by government ([20]).
The amount of supplied land is based on city planning, land quota, economic activity, population,
income and expenditures, etc. Though there are policies that restrict the ratio of each type (e.g.,
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Figure 2.6: Dynamic Reclassification Effects
industrial, commercial, residential) of land supplied, the local government has discretion to some
extent on allocating shares of land on different types of use. According to [37] and [20], after
government acquired all land from rural farms and established a land reserve center for manage-
ment, approximately 20%-30% percent of land reserves were transferred for residential use and
offered to the markets, mostly through public auctions. Additionally, around 50% was transferred
to investors for industrial use, mostly through negotiation. The price for industrial use was much
lower than for residential use. In order to develop the local economy and balance their budgets,
local governments would attract outside investments by increasing the supply of industrial land
with lower price. At the same time, they tend to supply less residential land in order to inflate the
average unit price to finance government expenditures.
In order to show how in situ migrants lead to oversupply in the local land and housing markets,
I aggregate my community reclassification information at the prefecture level and link it to the
land and population data sets. Data on land comes from the China Urban Construction Statistical
Yearbooks. Figure 2.7 graphically shows a strong positive relationship between land supply and
urban population growth.
In terms of the land supply for residential use, to empirically show whether local governments
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Figure 2.7: Urban Population Growth and Total Land Supply
consider urban population growth as one of the key determinants on the amount of residential land
supplied in the primary land market, I adopt the following OLS fixed-effects panel data model
using prefecture-year observations for all prefectures which I can obtain urban population data
from 2010-2015. Specifically, the regression equation is:
Residential_Landj,t = αj + ρt + βUrban_Populationj,t−1 +X ′j,t−1γ + jt (2.5)
where Residential_Landj,t is the total land for residential use in prefecture j as of year t while
Urban_Populationj,t−1 the one-year lagged measure for the urban population in prefecture j.
Both variables are logged so the coefficient β can be interpreted as the elasticity of residential land
with respect to urban population. I control for the prefecture fixed effects and year fixed effects as
well as a list of one-year lagged prefecture-level time-varying covariates including the prefecture
area, per capita GDP, per capita fiscal income, per capita size of paved roads and green spaces.
Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level.
Regression results are shown in Table 2.32. Column 1 presents the results only controlling
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for the prefecture and year fixed effects. The elasticity of residential land with respect to urban
population is large in magnitude and statistically significant. A one percent increase in urban
population is associated with 0.43 percent increase in residential land in the next year, indicating
that total urban population growth is a strong predictor of residential land supply. In Column 2,
I add the lagged prefecture-level covariates as in my baseline specification in Equation 2.5, the
coefficient increases to 0.52 and still highly significant. In the next column, I further include the
region-by-year fixed effects35 to account for potential differential changes in different regions due
to the central government policies in favor of less developed central and western provinces, the
coefficient is almost unchanged. Lastly, in Column 4, I allow each prefecture to have its own linear
trend; again, the elasticity is high both economically and statistically. As expected and in line with
the urban planning literature in China, the growth in urban population is a key determinant on the
amount of residential land supplied within the prefecture.
In addition, it is interesting to explore whether this elasticity is heterogeneous across prefec-
tures with different attributes. While it is plausible to categorize different prefectures by different
dimensions, I would divide prefectures into three tiers, which has been widely used officially
and unofficially. To be more specific, I am dealing with this potential heterogeneity between the
second-tier and third-tier cities36. Second-tier cities consist of most provincial capitals and munici-
palities that are local economic and political centers while the remaining prefectures are considered
the third-tier. Table 2.33 shows the results for prefectures from the two tiers. Unlike Tier 3 cities
which are relatively less developed, for tier 2 prefectures, residential land supply is inelastic to
urban population growth. The different sensitivities of land supply to population growth might re-
flect the different weights of urban population in the urban planning process. Since the second-tier
prefectures are usually provincial capitals or local economic centers, they tend to attract population
from nearby less developed third-tier prefectures on a fixed bases. As a result, urban population is
less predictive of land supply in these prefectures.
35I divide the country into three regions: East, Central and West.
36The first-tier cities include Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, two provincial-level municipalities and
two prefecture-level cities in the coastal Guangdong province. These four cities have a large urban population and
enjoy a large wave of immigrants, with very different policies in the land and housing markets.
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Table 2.32: Urban Population and Residential Land
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Urban Population) 0.430∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗
(0.147) (0.171) (0.154) (0.281)
Ln(City Size) 0.125∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.044) (0.042) (0.037)
Ln(Road Size pc) 0.282 0.284 0.434
(0.236) (0.220) (0.287)
Ln(Greenland Size pc) -0.040 -0.047 -0.026
(0.065) (0.070) (0.041)
Ln(GDP pc) -0.117 -0.126 -0.156
(0.101) (0.101) (0.165)
Ln(Fiscal Income pc) -0.011 -0.005 -0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.007)
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region by Year FE No No Yes No
Prefecture Linear Trend No No No Yes
R2 0.093 0.126 0.142 0.631
Observations 1560 1437 1437 1437
Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level.
Reported R-squres are the within R-squares from prefecture fixed effects regressions
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.33: Urban Population and Residential Land: by Prefecture Tiers
Tier 2-3 Tier 2 Tier 3
Ln(Urban Population) 0.465∗∗∗ 0.195 0.509∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.256) (0.174)
Ln(City Size) 0.117∗∗∗ 0.038 0.122∗∗
(0.044) (0.072) (0.049)
Ln(Road Size pc) 0.267 0.067 0.295
(0.236) (0.084) (0.266)
Ln(Greenland Size pc) -0.043 -0.042 -0.045
(0.065) (0.077) (0.072)
Ln(GDP pc) -0.047 -0.037 -0.050
(0.062) (0.066) (0.085)
Ln(Fiscal Income pc) -0.014 0.203 -0.015
(0.012) (0.128) (0.013)
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.134 0.456 0.124
Observations 1419 225 1194
Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level.
Reported R-squres are the within R-squares from prefecture fixed effects regressions
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.4.2 In Situ Migrants and Residential Land Supply
The fact that urban population growth is a strong determinant of local land supply for residen-
tial use is expected. However, different prefectures might have different compositions of urban
population growth. For example, in metropolises, migration both from rural areas within the pre-
fecture and from outside the prefecture might account for the majority of urban population growth
while in some small and remote prefectures in situ migrants might dominate. As a result, it is of
importance to find whether the elasticity of land supply with respect to urban population differs
across different sources. I shed light on this question by regressing residential land supply on
different sources of urban population growth.
I define nominal urban population growth as the difference in the total urban population as of
2015 and 2010 within a prefecture. I estimate the prefecture-level scale of in situ migrants by using
the same approach when I estimate the overall scale nationwide. By assuming that the mean of
residents among all rural villages in a prefecture is similar to that of reclassified communities in the
same prefecture (which has been supported by descriptive evidence using community-level data in
Section2.337), I am able to estimate the scale of in situ migrants by multiplying the prefecture’s ru-
ral population in 2010 by the share of reclassified communities. I then define real urban population
growth by subtracting the scale of in situ migrants from nominal urban population growth.
The regression equation is as follows:
yc,p,∆t = β0 + β1 ∗Real_UPGc,p,∆t + β2 ∗ In_Situc,p,∆t +X ′c,p,t0γ + φp + c,p,∆t (2.6)
where yc,p,∆t measures the land supply of prefecture c in province p during time period ∆t;
Real_UPGc,p,∆t and In_Situ_Migrantc,p,∆t measure the real urban population growth and the
scale of in situ migrants respectively. Xc,p,t0 is a list of control variables similar to those in Equa-
tion 2.5 but they are measured as of the base year (2010). I also add the level of residential land
37Actually, in summary statistics from all waves of community survey, the number of residents in reclassified
communities is slightly larger than that in rural villages.
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as a control variable. φp controls for province fixed effects38. Standard errors are clustered at the
province level.
Table 2.34 shows the results of the relationship between different sources of urban population
growth and residential land supply. In Column 1, I only include the total urban population growth,
an overall measure. Similar to my results using the prefecture-level panel data set, the coefficient
which can be interpreted as elasticity is 0.58, large and highly significantly different from zero,
implying a strong relationship between urban population growth and residential land supply. In
the next two columns, I add my measure of real urban population growth and in situ migrants
respectively. Both measures are of similar size and significant. In the last column, I include
both measures in one regression. Both coefficients are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged.
While this result is suggestive, it shows that the elasticity of residential land supply with respect
urban population from in siut migrants is almost as large as predictive as that with respect to real
urban population growth, the group of which is thought to have real demand for the urban housing
markets.
In addition, I divide the cities into different tiers and estimate Equation 2.6 separately. While
residential land supply is inelastic to urban population growth in Tier-2 cities, it is very sensitive
to both real urban population growth and in situ migrants in smaller Tier-3 cities, consistent with
what I find from the panel data regressions.
38For the four province-level municipalities, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing, the results are virtually
unchanged if these four observations are dropped.
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Table 2.34: Urban Population Growth and Annual Residential Land Supply
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Nominal UPG) 0.580∗∗∗
(0.103)
Ln(Real UPG) 0.311∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.047)
Ln(In Situ Migrant) 0.218∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.049)
Ln(Residential Size pc) 0.149 0.015 -0.011 0.038
(0.094) (0.155) (0.124) (0.128)
Ln(GDP pc) 0.464∗∗∗ 0.426∗ 0.502∗∗ 0.510∗
(0.164) (0.221) (0.219) (0.263)
Ln(Fiscal Income pc) -0.192 -0.153 -0.098 -0.236
(0.148) (0.163) (0.159) (0.207)
Ln(Road Size pc) 0.137 0.237∗ 0.220 0.265
(0.135) (0.130) (0.166) (0.176)
Ln(Green Size pc) -0.170∗∗ -0.218∗ -0.227∗ -0.192
(0.081) (0.121) (0.127) (0.125)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.688 0.610 0.575 0.678
Observations 248 226 239 194
Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.35: Urban Population Growth and Annual Residential Land Supply
Tier 2-3 Tier 2 Tier 3
Ln(Real UPG) 0.307∗∗∗ 0.667 0.218∗∗∗
(0.054) (1.617) (0.061)
Ln(In Situ Migrant) 0.247∗∗∗ -0.150 0.226∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.931) (0.054)
Ln(Residential Size pc) 0.032 3.953∗∗∗ -0.064
(0.130) (0.624) (0.122)
Ln(GDP pc) 0.491∗ -0.391 0.326
(0.260) (2.986) (0.214)
Ln(Fiscal Income pc) -0.208 0.404 -0.172
(0.210) (2.634) (0.200)
Ln(Road Size pc) 0.266 -0.969 0.291
(0.176) (0.857) (0.186)
Ln(Green Size pc) -0.189 -1.768∗∗ -0.202
(0.135) (0.706) (0.150)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.680 0.960 0.632
Observations 192 28 164
Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3. TENURE SECURITY AND AGRICULTURAL LAND UTILIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM
CHINA
3.1 Background
3.1.1 Land Tenure System in China
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, all means of production were
gradually transferred to public ownership. Land, which serves as the most important input in agri-
cultural production, was no exception. In most villages at that time, land was mainly classified
into two types in terms of managerial rights: private plots and collectively-owned plots. During
the People’s Commune period from early 1960s to late 1970s, although all land was collectively
owned, commune members were allowed to manage their own private land for some extra agricul-
tural activities, such as raising livestocks. Private plots only accounted for very small proportions
of the total arable land and they were not allowed for transfer. The Regulations on the Work of the
Rural People’s Commune implemented in 1962 by the Central Committee of Communist Party of
China (CCCPC) stated that the size of all private plots managed by commune members should be
around 5% to 7% of the size of total arable land under the control of the commune.
With the introduction of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in the early 1980s, the
property rights of land were divided into ownership right and managerial right. On one hand, land
is still collectively owned; on the other hand, households are allocated an amount of land, mainly
on the egalitarian basis and are entitled the managerial rights on the land with residual claimant to
outputs. They were subsequently provided a 15-year land use right. This reform greatly encour-
aged farmers’ enthusiasm, resulting in tremendous increase in both outputs and productivity. This
success prompted a recommendation to renew contracts for additional 30 years upon expiration of
the original 15-year lease in the late 1990s ([17])1.
Even though the lease contract has been expanded, there still exist institutional risks threatening
1This renew is generally called second-round contract
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the land tenure security. Rural land in contract is still subject to administrative redistribution by
village leaders or compulsory expropriation by local governments. Due to demographic changes
over time, total or partial contractual land would be redistributed across households within the
village. This reallocation tends to have considerable administrative support.
Another threat to land tenure security is through expropriation. Agricultural land is requisite
by local government and then sold for non-agricultural use. There are compensation standards for
land being expropriated, but implementations vary. Although such phenomenon is much alleviated
by the introduction of the new Rural Land Contracting Law in 2003 ([17]), it still remains one
major risk for land tenure security.
Land rental activities were prohibited in the early phases of HRS, ([17]), nor were households
allowed to use land as collaterals. Although such restriction was loosened later, the insecure land
tenure still restricts development of the land rental market, as households who would like to be
involved in land rental activities are worried about their land being expropriated or required for
readjustment. For example, renting out land by a household could be interpreted as a signal that
land is not needed any more, which might lead to a range of land readjustment. This is argued to
create disincentives for free migration of villagers from agricultural sector to non-farm activities,
both locally and to the city ([49]). [22] show that in response to an expected land reallocation
in the following year, the probability that a rural resident migrates out of the county declines by
2.8 percentage points, almost 17.5 percent of the annual share of village residents who worked as
migrants. However, as wage difference between agricultural and non-agricultural sector is large
and still increasing, many rural laborers migrate to city for work. In the absence of a secure
land tenure and an well-functioning land transfer market, households with insufficient agricultural
labors might only leave their land abandoned, leading to the underutilization of agricultural land.
3.1.2 The Rural Land Certification Program
The establishment of land transferring system was first raised in a document about stabilizing
and improving the rural land contract by the State Council in 1995. It stated that under the con-
dition that the ownership and the use of the land are unchanged, the contractor may rent, swap
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and use land as stock shares, with the consent of the rural collectivity. The first time that the rural
land certificate, formally the certificates of the right to contracted management of rural land, was
mentioned was from another State Council document about further stabilizing and improving the
rural land contract in 1997. This document formally emphasized that the contract was expanded
for another 30 years; more importantly, it stated that for households that expanded their leasing
period, they should be issued certificates of the right to contracted management of rural land by
the local government at the county level or above in a timely manner. These reforms were finally
legislated into the new Rural Land Contracting Law, which required responsibility of the local
government for the issuance of the rural land certificate and transferring of land managerial rights.
The Ministry of Agriculture then detailed all information that are required in the certificate, includ-
ing land contract date and the size and boundaries of each parcel. However, the implementation
varied across villages and the process was slow.
It was not until the year 2009 that the No.1 policy document of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and the State Council reinforced the stability of rural land contract as a basis of
stabilizing agricultural institutions in rural areas and proposed the development of land certificate
program in some experimental pilots all over the country. It also prohibited reallocating land during
the process of certification. The Ministry of Agriculture chose villages from 8 provinces as pilots
to restart the land certification program. After several years’ trial, the 2013 No.1 policy document
developed this program nationwide and set the plan to finish certifying rural land in all villages
within five years. In 2014, three provinces (Anhui, Shandong and Sichuan) were chosen to develop
the program in all villages. As of March 2016, around 20% of rural arable land had been finished
certifying.
This round of land certification program can be seen as the extension of the policy back in
mid-1990s, since their targets are the same as to provide land contract households with a certificate
that helps secure land tenure. The differences lie in that the land certifying program in recent years
were implemented by the upper-level governments with more administrative power. In addition,
measurement of specific parcel information is more accurate by using electronic tools while all
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information collected would be stored electronically in a public dataset platform supported by the
State Archives Administration and will be linked to the registration of the real estate property.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data Source
Data used in this paper are from the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), conducted by
the Survey and Research Center for China Household Finance at the Southwestern University of
Finance and Economics. So far the project has collected data in 4 waves: 2011, 2013, 2015 and
2017. The first wave, in the summer of 2011, covered 80 counties in 25 provinces and collected
data from 8,438 households all over 320 communities. The second wave in 2013 enlarged its sam-
ple to 28,143 households in 1,048 communities across 29 provincial-level regions 2. The 2015
wave and 2017 wave consist of 37,341 households from 1,373 communities and 40,011 house-
holds from 1,428 communities respectively. The samples from the most recent two waves are
representative at both province and deputy-provincial city levels.
The sampling of communities in CHFS data follows a stratified method with probability pro-
portionate to size. In the first step, all counties are divided into ten categories with respect to their
rankings in GDP per capita, from which sample counties are drawn. Then sample communities are
randomly drawn from these sample counties.
With all waves combined, the dataset is a nationally representative panel containing rich micro-
level information on households’ balance sheet, income, consumptions, and saving behaviors. Be-
sides, starting from the second wave, it also included a community-level survey for all sampled
communities, the questionnaire of which consists of questions regarding the basic demographic
and geographic information, public infrastructure, community economy and local governance at
the community level. For rural villages, it also asks detailed information on agricultural activities.
Moreover, the community survey of CHFS 2017 asked each community with rural land whether
agricultural land in the village had been certified and if so, the specific year that the certification
2There are 31 provincial-level regions in mainland China. The only two that are not included in the sample are
Xinjiang and Tibet, two Minority Autonomous Regions in western China. The agriculture sector in these two regions
is mainly animal husbandry, where arable land is limited.
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was finished and the method of certification, from which I can back out the information whether
cultivated land in the village had been certified in previous waves.
As a result, this paper exploits data from the 2015 and 2017 surveys, both the household and
community levels, as these two waves have a larger sample size and I could construct a panel
with detailed information with respect to agricultural activities. The land abandonment variables
are available in both waves of community survey but only available in the 2017 household sur-
vey. In consequence, I employ the community-level panel data for our main results while use the
2017 household-level cross-sectional data as a check for robustness. Additionally, the two-period
household-level panel dataset provides plenty of information that allows me to test possible mecha-
nisms through which the land tenure affects land utilization. Such explanations include agricultural
investments, land transfer activities and labor migration, illustrated by the related literature.
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
There are 1,362 observations in the CHFS 2015 community survey while the CHFS 2017 sur-
vey consists of 1,417 communities. I combine rural villages with agricultural land that are in
both waves and construct a panel dataset. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of villages across
provinces. As can be seen, I have data of sampled villages from almost every province while in
most provinces, I have at least ten villages, indicating the representativeness of the dataset. After
appending the two waves’ community survey data into a panel, I find for some communities, there
were large changes in terms of the size of total agricultural land, which is abnormal given the fixed
size of total village area. I thus drop these extreme observations in the empirical analysis3. In the
analysis using community level panel data, my final sample size is 198 villages every year.
Table 3.1 and 3.2 present demographic and geographic information for rural communities in
my balanced panel dataset in CHFS 2015 and 2017, respectively. Geographically, of those with
agricultural land, they are on average over 70 kilometers away from the center of the city with
less than 2 roads toward. For community-level demographics, a typical village has more than 600
3Specifically, I calculate the ratio of agricultural land size across the two waves and drop villages with the ratio
less than 0.75 or greater than 1.25. Results are qualitatively similar for alternative thresholds.
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Figure 3.1: Rural Communities with Agricultural Land
households; number of residents4 are around 2,106 in CHFS 2015 and 2,066 in CHFS 2017. Num-
ber of registered residents are also quite stable across years, from 2,431 in 2015 to around 2,336
in 2017. Over 95% of registered residents hold rural Hukou, with very little variation between
the two survey periods. The difference between number of residents and Hukou residents indicate
the net emigration from rural villages to city. Moreover migrant workers from these communities
account for 23% of total registered residents. Percentage of communities with Internet connection
increased from 86% in 2015 to 92% in 2017. With respect to income, data suggest that the average
disposable income per capita across those communities increased by more than 1,000 yuan during
the two-year period. Table 3.1 and 3.2 also show the different characteristics for villages that have
land certified and that have not, in both waves. Most variables are quite identical across these two
types of villages and stable over years. However, in terms of demographics, certified villages tend
to have less households and residents while the disposable income is on average higher.
In terms of information regarding agricultural land, Table 3.3 summarizes community-level
4Residents include those who hold a local Hukou and live in the local community and those who do not have a
local Hukou but live in the local community for more than 6 months.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Communities in CHFS 2015
Overall Certi=0 Certi=1
Distance to Center 78.72 78.34 81.11
(64.94) (66.52) (55.07)
Roads to Center 1.42 1.42 1.43
(0.63) (0.63) (0.63)
Households 618.03 618.39 615.86
(418.95) (420.39) (417.70)
Residents 2,106.05 2,165.04 1,747.89
(1,844.32) (1,895.79) (1,472.34)
Hukou Residents 2,431.04 2,495.01 2,044.93
(2,113.48) (2,206.33) (1,398.74)
Ag-Hukou Ratio 0.96 0.96 0.95
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Migrant Ratio 0.23 0.23 0.23
(0.17) (0.17) (0.15)
Internet 0.86 0.85 0.93
(0.35) (0.36) (0.26)
Featured Industry 0.44 0.42 0.57
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Disposable Income 6,991.61 6,785.11 8,245.36
(6,249.67) (5,974.37) (7,724.68)
Dibao Ratio 0.05 0.04 0.06
(0.08) (0.05) (0.19)
Observations 198 170 28
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
79
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Communities in CHFS 2017
Overall Certi=0 Certi=1
Distance to Center 83.98 83.06 85.14
(65.30) (67.84) (62.34)
Roads to Center 1.68 1.65 1.72
(0.75) (0.75) (0.76)
Households 636.28 664.77 600.66
(414.43) (436.98) (383.89)
Residents 2,065.93 2,181.25 1,921.80
(1,701.72) (1,864.49) (1,471.08)
Hukou Residents 2,336.53 2,469.14 2,170.76
(1,750.39) (1,932.05) (1,486.93)
Ag-Hukou Ratio 0.95 0.96 0.94
(0.15) (0.14) (0.17)
Migrant Ratio 0.24 0.22 0.26
(0.17) (0.15) (0.20)
Internet 0.92 0.91 0.94
(0.27) (0.29) (0.23)
Featured Industry 0.54 0.51 0.57
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Disposable Income 8,119.12 7,515.50 8,873.64
(5,306.92) (5,306.35) (5,240.05)
Dibao Ratio 0.05 0.04 0.06
(0.08) (0.05) (0.11)
Observations 198 110 88
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Agricultural Land
2015 2017
Ag Land Size 3,538.55 3,562.78
(3,490.25) (3,538.40)
Transfer Activity 0.77 1.00
(0.42) (0.00)
Land Certification 0.14 0.44
(0.35) (0.50)
Abandoned Land 0.31 0.33
(0.46) (0.47)
Mechanization Ratio 0.71 0.78
(0.34) (0.32)
Economic Crop Ratio 0.32 0.36
(0.32) (0.34)
Land Acquisition 0.25 0.25
(0.44) (0.43)
Polluted Land 0.06 0.07
(0.23) (0.26)
Observations 198 198
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
characteristics across the two waves. Total agricultural land size increases slightly from 3,539
Mu per village to around 3,563 Mu within two years. While only 77% percent communities have
land transferring activities5 in 2015, in 2017 land transfer activities are common in all sampled
communities. Around 30% of villages have abandoned land. 70% of agricultural land is cultivated
with machines while around one third of agricultural land is used for economic crops.
As for the land certification program, these two years witnessed wider spread of the program.
Since the two waves all took place in the summer, questions are all about the previous year6. Thus,
5In the survey questionnaire, land transfer activity does not restrict to arable land; it consists of all types of land for
rural use such as forestry and aquaculture.
6For example, the CHFS 2015 survey asked detailed questions regarding the year 2014.
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for the CHFS 2015 communities, I define villages that finished certifying by the year 2014 as cer-
tified villages. In CHFS 2015, only 14% percent of villages with agricultural land had finished
certifying while this increased considerably to more than 44% in CHFS 2017 survey. Figure 3.2
shows the distribution of years with land being certified. The frequencies closely follow the pat-
tern in which the land certification program evolved. After the policy was first raised in 1997,
there were several villages in my sample implementing the policy. However, the program stag-
nated in the 2000s. Beginning in 2009 when the Ministry of Agriculture started the experiment in
8 provinces for this program, the number of communities with land certification started to grow
again, especially after the year 2013 when this program was quickly expanded all across the coun-
try. Out of all communities that finished this program by the end of 2016, the majority were done
during the period 2014-2016 while almost half were done in the single year 2016. Figure 3.3 and
3.4 show the share of certified community across provinces. In Figure 3.3, only Chongqing mu-
nicipality has over 75% certified villages. However, in CHFS 2017, Shandong, Jiangxi, Shaanxi
provinces and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region all had more than 75% communities with certifica-
tion and these provinces are widely located all over the country. Despite the trend that the number
of certified villages has been rapidly growing, the program is still less developed and more than
half rural villages so far still lack sufficient security for their land tenure.
Additionally, Table 3.4 and 3.5 show some household-level demographic and economic infor-
mation in CHFS 2015 and 2017 respectively. In CHFS 2015, on average, there are less than four
members in a household while this number decreases to 3.62 in CHFS 2017. Across two waves,
more than 90% of households have all members with agricultural Hukou. The ratio of households
with migrant worker increases from 10% in CHFS 2015 to around 18% in CHFS 2017, while the
total value for assets also increases by around 10%. Additionally, almost all households have their
own housing units and this number is quite stable across years. In terms of agricultural character-
istics, more than 80% of households participated in agricultural activities with average land size
increasing from 7.57 Mu to 8.32 Mu. In CHFS 2015, 13% of households transfer their land out
and 20% transfer land in; these ratios are 21% and 16% respectively in CHFS 2017.
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Figure 3.2: Years of Rural Land Certification Program
Figure 3.3: Rural Communities with Land Certification from CHFS2015
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Households in CHFS 2015
Overall Certi=0 Certi=1
Household Size 3.86 3.92 3.55
(1.79) (1.81) (1.65)
Head Age 56.30 56.14 57.23
(11.12) (11.10) (11.20)
Head Schooling 6.97 7.03 6.63
(3.22) (3.19) (3.36)
All with Ag Hukou 0.92 0.92 0.93
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Head Non-ag Hukou 0.03 0.02 0.04
(0.16) (0.15) (0.19)
Number of Laborers 2.45 2.50 2.15
(1.38) (1.39) (1.28)
Have Migrant 0.10 0.10 0.06
(0.30) (0.30) (0.24)
Number of Migrants 0.15 0.16 0.08
(0.52) (0.54) (0.36)
Asset Value 293,746.79 293,847.53 293,164.31
(512,979.37) (512,556.07) (516,080.72)
Have House 0.98 0.98 0.97
(0.14) (0.13) (0.18)
Have Vehicle 0.13 0.12 0.15
(0.33) (0.33) (0.35)
Observations 2645 2255 390
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics for Households in CHFS 2017
Overall Certi=0 Certi=1
Household Size 3.62 3.66 3.57
(1.73) (1.71) (1.76)
Head Age 57.25 56.73 57.87
(11.24) (11.34) (11.11)
Head Schooling 7.07 7.04 7.10
(3.26) (3.22) (3.32)
All with Ag Hukou 0.93 0.93 0.93
(0.26) (0.25) (0.26)
Head Non-ag Hukou 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.16) (0.17) (0.15)
Number of Laborers 2.17 2.24 2.08
(1.34) (1.33) (1.35)
Have Migrant 0.18 0.18 0.18
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Number of Migrants 0.25 0.25 0.26
(0.62) (0.60) (0.63)
Asset Value 320,730.24 330,236.52 309,317.96
(684,408.51) (600,217.06) (773,578.39)
Have House 0.96 0.97 0.96
(0.18) (0.17) (0.20)
Have Vehicle 0.17 0.17 0.18
(0.38) (0.37) (0.38)
Observations 2645 1443 1202
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
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Figure 3.4: Rural Communities with Land Certification from CHFS2017
Overall, in both my community- and household-level panel data I construct using two waves of
CHFS datasets, I find quite identical results across certified and uncertified villages in both years.
These balanced descriptive statistics may partly alleviate the concern that villages that are selected
into certification in my sample are due to some demographic or agricultural characteristics.
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Estimation Strategy
In order to distinguish the effect of agricultural land certification program from confounding
factors, I exploit the within-community variations caused by timing of the program. Specifically,
I use a generalized difference-in-differences research design and compares changes in agricultural
land utilization in certified communities with uncertified communities.
Formally, I take advantage of my two-period community-level dataset to estimate a fixed-
effects ordinary least squares panel data model, where my outcome variable is the ratio of aban-
doned land at the community level. I also use a dummy indicating whether there exists abandoned
agricultural land in a community as another outcome variable for robustness check. The OLS
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regression equation is as follows,
yjt = βCertijt +X
′
jtδ + αj + γt + jt (3.1)
where Certijt is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if community j in year t has finished
land certification program, and 0 otherwise. Xjt is a vector of control variables. Specifically,
I include some community-level demographic and economic variables, for example, number of
households, number of residents, number of residents with agricultural Hukou, all in log terms,
Internet connection, the ratio of residents relying on subsistence allowance, village income and
a dummy variable indicating whether there are some special featured industry within the village.
As mentioned before, land acquisition by upper-level governments is a major threats to land tenure
security and thus affects land utilization. In this sense, I include a dummy variable of whether rural
land in the community has been acquired since 2000. αj and γt control for community and year
fixed effects. In this way, my estimation equation is a generalized difference-in-differences model
estimating the pure effects of land certification program on agricultural land abandonment. In all
specifications, standard errors are clustered at the county level.
3.3.2 Results
Regression results from Equation 3.1 using the ratio of abandoned agricultural land as out-
come variable are show in Table 3.6. In Column 1, I include only control variables regarding
demographic information. I add the land acquisition variables in Column 2. In Column 3, I further
add three variables indicating the economic development of the village. In all specifications, results
are similar, both qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, in Column 1, the land certification
program reduced the ratio of idle land in the village by 2.6%, and is significantly different from
zero at the 10% level, which implies a positive effect in improving land utilization for agricultural
use.
For estimators of the control variables, some results are also of interest. In terms of village
demographics, larger number of residents suggests more labor supply in the village and thus are
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Table 3.6: Dependent Variable: Land Abandonment Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certification -0.026∗ -0.027∗ -0.029∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Ln(Households) -0.065 -0.065 -0.070
(0.048) (0.049) (0.052)
Ln(Residents) -0.011 -0.010 -0.016
(0.032) (0.032) (0.029)
Ln(Ag-Hukou Residents) -0.057∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Dibao Ratio 0.072 0.070 0.067
(0.064) (0.063) (0.062)
Land Acquisition -0.023 -0.022
(0.023) (0.024)
Featured Industry -0.030
(0.021)
Internet 0.030
(0.042)
Village Income -0.003
(0.003)
R2 0.157 0.166 0.195
Observations 388 388 382
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Community fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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associated with less abandoned land. Additionally, having some featured industries in the village
is associated with less abandoned land. One possible explanation might be that with the featured
industry, more labors would stay in the village rather than migrate, thus increase labor supply in
the agricultural activity during the busy seasons.
My specification using the dummy variable of whether there exists idle land in a village yields
similar results. For example, in Column 1 of Table 3.7, having agricultural land being certified
reduces the probability of having abandoned land by more than 12%, a large magnitude compared
with the fact that villages with land abandoned account for 36% in my sample.
3.3.3 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, I conduct multiple robustness checks.
First, instead of a year fixed effects, I estimate a specification that controls for province-year
fixed effects. Doing this way, I allow each province to have its own trends in these two waves. Re-
sults in Table 3.8 show that results are qualitatively indifferent from my baseline model controlling
for year fixed effects.
In addition, villages in my sample have a large gap in terms of years of certification. For
example, a few villages have land certified in late 1990s while most villages have it done after
2015. One might worry that land certification in earlier periods might have differential effects
compared with that in later periods. Thus, I restrict my sample to villages with land certification in
different cutoff years. In Table 3.9, I exclude villages with land certification before 2009 while in
Table 3.10 I exclude those before 2013. Results are both quite identical to my baseline full-sample
estimates.
In order further to estimate the impact of the most recent wave of land certification, I drop
all sampled villages that had finished the program before 2016 and conduct an event study. After
dropping those villages, all left are those either uncertified (the control group) or certified at the
year 2016 (the treatment group). Thus, I can compare village-level characteristics prior to the
treatment assignment to conduct a balance test and adopt the propensity score matching approach
to construct a matched uncertified control group to further mitigate the bias from selection into
89
Table 3.7: Dependent Variable: Land Abandonment Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certification -0.122∗ -0.123∗ -0.127∗
(0.072) (0.072) (0.073)
Ln(Ag Land Size) 0.591 0.586 0.598
(0.428) (0.427) (0.439)
Ln(Households) -0.074 -0.074 -0.083
(0.123) (0.124) (0.130)
Ln(Residents) -0.129 -0.128 -0.134∗
(0.080) (0.079) (0.080)
Ln(Ag-Hukou Residents) -0.072∗∗ -0.074∗∗ -0.077∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Dibao Ratio 0.077 0.074 0.075
(0.176) (0.175) (0.178)
Land Acquisition -0.026 -0.019
(0.061) (0.063)
Featured Industry -0.110∗
(0.063)
Internet 0.070
(0.082)
Village Income 0.001
(0.015)
R2 0.063 0.064 0.083
Observations 388 388 382
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Community fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Dependent Variable: Land Abandonment Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certification -0.039∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Ln(Households) -0.095∗∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.101∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.047)
Ln(Residents) -0.011 -0.010 -0.021
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Ln(Ag-Hukou Residents) -0.054∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Dibao Ratio 0.103∗ 0.097∗ 0.087
(0.057) (0.057) (0.055)
Land Acquisition -0.022 -0.024
(0.025) (0.026)
Featured Industry -0.037∗
(0.020)
Internet 0.027
(0.032)
Village Income -0.005
(0.005)
R2 0.311 0.317 0.355
Observations 388 388 382
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Community fixed effects and province-year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: Dependent Variable: Land Abandonment Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certification -0.034∗ -0.034∗ -0.034∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Ln(Households) -0.070 -0.069 -0.074
(0.050) (0.051) (0.054)
Ln(Residents) -0.009 -0.008 -0.016
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031)
Ln(Ag-Hukou Residents) -0.056∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.059∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Dibao Ratio 0.149 0.146 0.138
(0.122) (0.120) (0.117)
Land Acquisition -0.014 -0.013
(0.019) (0.021)
Featured Industry -0.023
(0.021)
Internet 0.027
(0.037)
Village Income -0.003
(0.004)
R2 0.181 0.184 0.207
Observations 369 369 363
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Community fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.10: Dependent Variable: Land Abandonment Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certification -0.033∗ -0.034∗ -0.034∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Ln(Households) -0.070 -0.070 -0.074
(0.051) (0.052) (0.055)
Ln(Residents) -0.010 -0.008 -0.015
(0.034) (0.034) (0.032)
Ln(Ag-Hukou Residents) -0.058∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.061∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Dibao Ratio 0.149 0.145 0.135
(0.123) (0.121) (0.117)
Land Acquisition -0.015 -0.015
(0.020) (0.022)
Featured Industry -0.018
(0.021)
Internet 0.027
(0.039)
Village Income -0.003
(0.005)
R2 0.189 0.193 0.212
Observations 353 353 347
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Community fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.11: Logistic Estimations for Selection into Treatment
Ln(Ag Land Size) 0.045 (0.045)
Ln(Households) -0.120 (0.103)
Ln(Residents) 0.169∗ (0.096)
Ln(Ag-Hukou Residents) -0.030 (0.032)
Dibao Ratio 0.883 (0.672)
Land Acquisition -0.042 (0.080)
Distance to Center -0.000 (0.001)
Featured Industry 0.092 (0.079)
Internet -0.040 (0.106)
Ln(Disposable Income) 0.032 (0.047)
Observations 149
Marginal effects are displayed.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
treatment. Selection into treatment may occur if the decision of timing of certification for villages
is dependent on some village-level characteristics, especially the agricultural activities. Therefore,
my matching technique is exploited to establish a set of control villages without certification that
are similar to villages certified in 2016, so that the analysis has a comparable counterfactual. I then
estimate OLS regressions of Equation 3.1 on my constructed sample of matched villages.
The set of covariates used to estimate and predict propensity scores is identical to those con-
trolled for in my baseline specification in Column 2 of Table 3.6. Additionally, I add the log
size of agricultural land to control for the endowment of a village. Results from the Probit model
using these covariates are shown in Table 3.11. Reassuringly, most of these covariates are not
significantly different from zero, implying that the assignment of land certification program is not
selective on these village-level observable characteristics. Only the village-level scale of residents
marginally predict the assignment of the program.
Results from a matched sample is shown in Table 3.12, with sample size 290. For both my
proxies of land utilization measurements, the coefficients of land certification dummy are quanti-
tatively similar to the baseline estimates, significantly at the 10% level. The land certification pro-
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gram is associated with a decrease of the abandoned rural land by 3.6% for villages that finished
this program in 2016 compared with uncertified villages. My results indicate that the program does
improves land utilization.
So far, I have done a list of robustness checks using village-level panel data. For the household-
level survey data, since the question regarding whether a household has abandoned land was only
asked in the CHFS 2017 questionnaire, it is not possible to construct a panel and do similar re-
gressions using household-level data. Alternatively, I keep only the CHFS 2017 households with
non-missing values of the dependent variable and run a regression using this cross-sectional data
with households in the aforementioned matched village samples. This result, though not a causal
inference, may provide some statistical evidence at the household level. Estimation results are
shown in Table 3.13. In different columns, I control for different sets of variables. Standard errors
are clustered at the village level. In all specifications, results are identical: in my matched samples,
households living in certified villages are associated with 2% less abandoned land compared with
households in uncertified villages.
3.3.4 Heterogeneous Effects
We then report OLS estimates using interactions of the land certification dummy with some
village-level economic conditions to show possible heterogeneous effects of land certification pro-
gram. For all my specifications, I use fixed-effects model and cluster standard errors at the county
level.
First, Table 3.14 divides communities into two groups according to their levels of disposable
income per capita in the first wave. It is clearly shown that the effect of land certification on
reduction of land abandonment is increasing in higher income villages. For those villages with low
disposable income, the coefficient is both economically and statistically indifferent from zero. On
the other hand, I find a large and significant result for high income villages.
We also explore some geographic variation of the effect of the program. I divide provinces into
subgroups according to their rankings in the share of GDP from agricultural sector. I measure the
share using the 2014 data published by the National Bureau of Statistics. Nationally, the agriculture
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Table 3.12: Estimation using matched control groups from PSM Results
Land Abandonment Ratio Land Abandonment Dummy
Land Certification -0.036∗ -0.132∗
(0.019) (0.076)
Land Acquisition -0.017 -0.045
(0.024) (0.052)
Ln(Households) -0.071 0.015
(0.060) (0.134)
Ln(Residents) -0.020 -0.196∗∗
(0.041) (0.095)
Ln(Ag-Hukou Residents) -0.062∗∗ -0.084∗∗
(0.026) (0.037)
Dibao Ratio 0.575∗ 1.664
(0.293) (1.019)
Featured Industry -0.018 -0.136∗∗
(0.022) (0.063)
Internet 0.022 -0.020
(0.042) (0.100)
Village Income -0.005 -0.012
(0.006) (0.019)
R2 0.266 0.169
Observations 290 290
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Community fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in both specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.13: Dependent Variable: Land Abandonment Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certi -0.019 -0.019∗ -0.019∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Household Size 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Head Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head Schooling -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
All with Ag Hukou -0.034 -0.034 -0.031
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Number of Laborers -0.014∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Asset Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Have Vehicle -0.004 -0.001 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Ln(Farmland Size) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Land Acquisition -0.003
(0.013)
Households in Village -0.016∗
(0.008)
Ag-Hukou Residents in Village 0.005
(0.006)
R2 0.019 0.030 0.032
Observations 1845 1845 1845
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.14: Dependent Variable: Land Abandonment Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Certi*Low Income -0.015 -0.015 -0.014
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Certi*High Income -0.040∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.049∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
Ln(Households) -0.067 -0.067 -0.072
(0.049) (0.050) (0.053)
Ln(Residents) -0.010 -0.009 -0.015
(0.031) (0.032) (0.029)
Ln(Ag-Hukou Residents) -0.056∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Dibao Ratio 0.073 0.070 0.068
(0.065) (0.063) (0.063)
Land Acquisition -0.024 -0.023
(0.023) (0.024)
Featured Industry -0.033
(0.022)
Internet 0.029
(0.042)
Village Income -0.003
(0.003)
R2 0.160 0.169 0.200
Observations 388 388 382
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Community fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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sector consists of 9% of the total GDP and ranges from the highest 23% in Hainan Province to less
than 1% in Beijing and Shanghai, two provincial-level municipal cities 7. Table 3.15 presents
the results. It shows that land certificate is more effective in provinces with higher share of GDP
contributed from agricultural sector.
3.3.5 Possible Mechanisms
So far I have established that there is a positive effect of the land certification program on
reducing idle agricultural land in China’s rural villages. The CHFS household-level panel data
also allow me to exploit its effects on other outcomes from agriculture and social welfare concepts,
which could help me better understand through which channel this effect works.
One possible explanation is that through land certification, farmers would have incentives to
increase investments in the certified land. In Table 3.16, I use values of machine for agricultural use
as a proxy to see whether the land certification improves investment related to production inputs.
The coefficients is positive but insignificant, which does not support the idea that land certification
program improves agricultural investments in rural areas.
Moreover, in some of the rural-urban migration literature, the effect of land certification on
migration is mixed. On the one hand, with land tenure being secured, rural labors would be more
likely to migrate to urban areas for work since they are no longer worried about their land being
expropriated. On the other hand, [40] uses surveys from China’s villages and found the effect of
tenure security on increasing migration is more significant for forestry land. In Table 3.17, I do not
find any significant results showing the effect of land tenure security on migration choice, which is
in line with [40] in their finding on agricultural land.
Moreover, much of the literature focuses on its effects on land rental market. From the household-
level survey, I am able to observe the land rental decision for each household. Thus, I use whether
a rural household rents in and out land to as dependent variables. Results are shown in Table 3.18
and 3.19. The coefficients are mixed and statistically indifferent from zero, showing that land
certification overall does not improve the land rental market, at least in the short run.
7Geographically, Beijing, Shanghai and Hainan are all eastern provinces.
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Table 3.15: Dependent Variable: Land Abandonment Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Certi*Low Ag Share -0.003 -0.004 -0.008
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Certi*High Ag Share -0.043∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Ln(Households) -0.066 -0.066 -0.071
(0.049) (0.050) (0.053)
Ln(Residents) -0.012 -0.010 -0.016
(0.031) (0.032) (0.029)
Ln(Ag-Hukou Residents) -0.059∗∗ -0.060∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Dibao Ratio 0.072 0.070 0.066
(0.065) (0.063) (0.062)
Land Acquisition -0.023 -0.022
(0.023) (0.024)
Featured Industry -0.027
(0.022)
Internet 0.032
(0.041)
Village Income -0.003
(0.003)
R2 0.164 0.173 0.200
Observations 388 388 382
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Community fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in both specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.16: Dependent Variable: Ln(Machine Value)
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certi 0.195 0.241 0.199
(0.209) (0.207) (0.204)
Household Size -0.121 -0.136 -0.134
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Head Age -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Head Schooling 0.058∗∗ 0.054∗ 0.053∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
All with Ag Hukou 0.338 0.268 0.291
(0.284) (0.282) (0.285)
Number of Laborers 0.262∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Asset Value 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Have Vehicle 0.003 0.002 0.018
(0.266) (0.266) (0.267)
Ln(Farmland Size) 0.601∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.142)
Land Acquisition -0.080
(0.222)
Households in Village -0.604
(0.369)
Ag-Hukou Residents in Village 0.010
(0.092)
R2 0.018 0.025 0.026
Observations 4985 4955 4941
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Household fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.17: Dependent Variable: Migrant Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certi 0.022 0.022 0.019
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Household Size 0.032∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Head Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head Schooling -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
All with Ag Hukou -0.057 -0.056 -0.054
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Number of Laborers 0.071∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Asset Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Have Vehicle 0.008 0.007 0.008
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Ln(Farmland Size) -0.023 -0.024
(0.015) (0.015)
Land Acquisition 0.000
(0.021)
Households in Village -0.048
(0.032)
Ag-Hukou Residents in Village 0.002
(0.012)
R2 0.120 0.120 0.121
Observations 4986 4956 4942
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Household fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.18: Dependent Variable: Rent in Land
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certi 0.029 0.030 0.027
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Household Size 0.008 0.009 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Head Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head Schooling 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
All with Ag Hukou 0.022 0.023 0.024
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Number of Laborers 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Asset Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Have Vehicle -0.013 -0.013 -0.012
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Ln(Farmland Size) -0.006 -0.007
(0.019) (0.019)
Land Acquisition -0.003
(0.018)
Households in Village -0.035
(0.043)
Ag-Hukou Residents in Village 0.007
(0.006)
R2 0.013 0.013 0.014
Observations 4986 4956 4942
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Household fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.19: Dependent Variable: Rent out Land
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certi -0.020 -0.022 -0.023
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
Household Size 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Head Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head Schooling 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
All with Ag Hukou 0.005 0.002 0.011
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047)
Number of Laborers -0.023∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Asset Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Have Vehicle 0.015 0.018 0.015
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Ln(Farmland Size) 0.029∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Land Acquisition -0.002
(0.031)
Households in Village -0.018
(0.054)
Ag-Hukou Residents in Village -0.009
(0.009)
R2 0.035 0.037 0.037
Observations 4979 4951 4937
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Household fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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However, though land certification program might not be able to improve the total land rental
activities, it might affect the land rental behavior through different entities who rent agricultural
land in. In order to further exploit the rental activities, I divide entities that transfer land into two
groups: individual households and agricultural business entities. There is a large body of literature
showing that land transfer between relatives and neighbors within a village is very common in
rural countryside, as there is no information asymmetry and little risk between acquaintances. In
CHFS 2017 survey, questions are asked for information regarding agricultural land transfer market,
for example, different types of entities that transfer land in, the size and rent for those entities.
Table 3.20 shows the difference of land rental behavior across villages with certification and those
without. Despite the fact that certified villages have more arable land endowment than non-certified
villages, the size of land that is transferred to individual households is not with much variation.
However, the size of land transferred to institutional agricultural entities such as cooperations or
companies related to agricultural sector as well as local farms that specialize in one crop with large
scales is much larger for villages with land certificate. Also, in certified villages, shares of land
transferred to those entities are much larger than that to individual households. Moreover, the rent
per Mu for land to those entities are also greater on average than rents to individual households,
suggesting that land transfer market is more formal in certified village.
In order to empirically test this hypothesis, I present OLS regressions using household-level
panel data in Table 3.21 and 3.22. Samples are restricted to households that participate in trans-
ferring land out. In Table 3.21, the dependent variable is whether the household transfers land to
another household while the dependent variable in Table 3.21 is a dummy that takes the value of
one if the household transfers land to a new agricultural business entity. From both tables, results
show that the land certification program decreases the possibility for a household to transfer land
to another household but significantly increases the probability for them to transfer to entities.
Thus, from both household-level regression estimates and village-level descriptive statistics, I
find evidence that the effect of land certification program on improving land utilization might be a
result that households with land being certified are more likely to transfer their cultivated land to
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Table 3.20: Comparison on Land Transfer Activities across Villages in 2017
Certi=0 Certi=1
Agricultural Business Entities 0.72 0.75
(0.45) (0.44)
Size to Households 539.51 461.96
(1,387.88) (789.12)
Size to ABE 329.45 644.84
(851.31) (1,246.02)
Rent for Housholds 427.40 484.81
(343.42) (665.60)
Rent for ABE 505.82 705.95
(340.28) (1,322.17)
Observations 110 88
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
new agricultural business entities that might possibly increase land utilization.
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Table 3.21: Dependent Variable: Rent out Land to Farmers
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certi -0.078 -0.102 -0.115
(0.076) (0.075) (0.070)
Household Size 0.047∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Head Age -0.003 -0.005∗ -0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Head Schooling -0.009 -0.019 -0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
All with Ag Hukou -0.060 -0.100∗ -0.140∗
(0.061) (0.058) (0.075)
Number of Laborers -0.114∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Asset Value -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Have Vehicle 0.109 0.110 0.107
(0.086) (0.074) (0.071)
Ln(Farmland Size) 0.142∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.056)
Land Acquisition -0.144∗∗
(0.055)
Households in Village 0.171∗
(0.095)
Ag-Hukou Residents in Village -0.048∗∗
(0.020)
R2 0.072 0.109 0.150
Observations 809 802 794
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Household fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.22: Dependent Variable: Rent out Land to Companies
(1) (2) (3)
Land Certi 0.145∗ 0.164∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.083) (0.084) (0.077)
Household Size -0.050∗ -0.054∗ -0.052∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Head Age 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Head Schooling 0.007 0.014 0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
All with Ag Hukou 0.087 0.108∗ 0.130∗
(0.059) (0.060) (0.069)
Number of Laborers 0.113∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Asset Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Have Vehicle -0.104 -0.103 -0.095
(0.096) (0.095) (0.093)
Ln(Farmland Size) -0.054 -0.077
(0.063) (0.058)
Land Acquisition 0.097
(0.064)
Households in Village -0.158∗
(0.091)
Ag-Hukou Residents in Village 0.072∗∗∗
(0.025)
R2 0.074 0.087 0.125
Observations 809 802 794
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Household fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4. CURRICULUM REFORM, EXAM RE-TAKING OPPORTUNITY COST AND
HOUSEHOLD EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Household Educational Investments in China
Traditionally, the Chinese place a very high value on education ([42]). Under the lasting in-
fluence of Confucianism, the officials (Shi) in imperial China were held in the highest regard, and
civil exam was the only road to officialdom for commoners ([8]). [3] show that the abolition of
this civil exam that lasts for more than 1,300 years caused political instability at the early 1900s.
The establishment of the People’s Republic of China greatly changed education policies, un-
der which schools at all levels were publicized. The Cultural Revolution starting in 1966 had a
catastrophic effect on China’s educational system as family background and political acceptability
instead of intelligence and exam scores became criteria for entrance into college ([30]). After such
a ten-year long interruption, universities in China reopened and resumed to enrolling students in
the late 1970s. The first College Entrance Examination (CEE) after Cultural Revolution took place
in the winter of 1977, since which it became the only way for most high school graduates to apply
for universities and colleges.
Figure 4.1 shows the total number of exam takers and enrollment rate since 1977. During the
first two decades after the resumption of CEE, the enrollment rate was comparatively low and never
exceeded 40%. At that time, being enrolled in a university is extremely competitive due to a limit
capacity of high education resources and high demand for education opportunities. [54] provide
estimates of the returns to schooling in urban China over the period 1988-2001, and show that
returns to education have changed from only 4% per year in 1988 to 10.2% per year in 2001. They
argue that such increasing returns are influenced by institutional reforms in the labor market that
raise the demand for skilled labor. In 1998, the central government and the Ministry of Education
began to invest more in facilities of universities and colleges all around the country and expand
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the scale of high education. In the year of 1999, the enrollment rate reached 56%, compared with
only 34% in 1998. Since then, the college enrollment never drops below 50% and recently in the
2010s, it bypassed 75%, indicating that 3 out of 4 high school graduates who took CEE would end
up being enrolled somewhere to achieve tertiary education.
Figure 4.1: College Entrance Exam: 1977-2016
Even though the enrollment rate increases, the competition has never been less intense, which
nowadays is mainly for a high quality of education, rather than the education opportunity ([56]).
[27] study the value of elite education in Chinese universities1 and find that receiving an elite
education increases the monthly wages of workers by 30-40% and such premium is more likely
to be explained by university-related networks and signaling. Such competition for a high quality
of education includes not only students but also parents. Since most households especially those
in urban areas have only one child, parents would wish their children to be admitted into an elite
university and thus obtain a better employment and social status upon graduation.
Household investments in children’s education take a variety of forms at different school levels.
For example, recently there has been a trend in some cities for affordable parents to send their chil-
1In China, tier-1 universities are publicly recognized as elite universities.
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dren into dual-language kindergartens2 for their children, sometimes even before they were born
because of the over demand, in the hope that their kid would be exposed to an environment with
English communications in their very early childhood. In addition, more and more households are
willing to pay premiums for apartments located in elite primary or junior middle schools’ neigh-
borhoods3 in order for their children being qualified to be enrolled into these schools. Furthermore,
wealthy parents prefer to send their children abroad in their early teens, where they could apply
for oversea high school and college without being involved in the competitive CEE in mainland
China.
Normal educational investments for Chinese families with children in senior high school in-
clude asking private tutors for certain subjects, attending out-of-school classes during weekends or
vacations ([52]). According to [47], more than half of senior high school students are involved in
private tutoring classes in urban China in 2004. Educational investments also take forms such as
purchasing electronic devices that help students’ learning efficiency. Furthermore, some parents
also provide comforting living environments for their children during their last year in high school.
For example, they would quit job and rent an apartment to accompany their children for the entire
academic year to prepare for CEE.
4.1.2 The Eighth Curriculum Reform in China
China’s eighth curriculum reform 4 is a nationwide education reform undertaken by the Chinese
central government beginning in 2001 ([5]) and formally started in 2004. It is characterized as three
news, i.e. new curriculum, new notion and new College Entrance Examination.
The new curriculum is introduced at the province level. All provinces and provincial-level
municipalities in China (except Shanghai) witnessed the introduction of new curriculum between
2004 and 2010. The introduction years for each province are shown in Figure 4.2. Incoming
students in the Fall 2004 in Guangdong, Hainan, Ningxia and Shandong provinces were among the
first cohorts to study under new curriculum and took CEE under new guidelines at the year 2007.
2Most dual-language schools refer to those who teach both Chinese and English.
3In Chinese, those apartments are called Xue Qu Fang.
4Formally, it is called New Curriculum Program for High School.
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With respect to this curriculum reform, [5] document both qualitative and quantitative evidence on
the changes of politics textbook content and the CEE guideline. Changes are also evident in other
subjects ([50]).
Figure 4.2: Years of Introduction of the New Curriculum
In addition, the curriculum reform is also associated with changes of College Entrance Exam
settings and guidelines as one characteristic is called "new CEE". In some provinces the CEE was
modified not only in guidelines but also in courses offered as well as their corresponding weights
in total scores. For example, in Shandong province in the year of 2007 in which the first cohort
under new curriculum took CEE, students were required to take a new subject called "Basic Ability
Test" which covered physical education, arts, music as well as basic technology questions. This
test lasted for seven years and was abolished in 2014. On the other hand, Jiangsu province, which
introduced new curriculum for the 2005 incoming high school cohort, adopted a more complex
CEE reform framework. Before the reform, the CEE was in form 3+25. Each subject has a full
5All students are required to take Chinese, mathematics and English. Students in natural science track can choose
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score 150, making the total score 750. After the adoption of new curriculum, the setting of CEE
was changed hugely. Students were asked to take academic assessments (mini CEE) at the end
of their second year in high school, including the natural science subjects or the social science
subjects which were compositions of regular CEE before. They only receive grade (e.g. A, B,
C etc.) instead of scores. Students with all A’s would receive extra points in addition to their
final CEE scores. In CEE, they only need to take Chinese, mathematics and English exams. For
students in natural science track, the score is 160 for Chinese, 200 for mathematics and 120 for
English. For social science track students, the score is 160 for mathematics, 200 for Chinese 120
for English, making the total score 480.
4.1.3 College Entrance Exam
Normally, students in senior high school are in their 10th to 12th years while most of their
time is spent to prepare for the College Entrance Examination. In their first year of senior high
school, they normally take some required courses in Chinese, English, mathematics as well as the
basic natural science courses (physics, chemistry and biology) and social science courses (politics,
geography, history). At the end of their first year, students can choose either the natural science
track or the social science track to specialize in as their field of the College Entrance Examination.
The timing of choosing field varies across schools. For examples, some high schools require their
students to choose their fields upon entry and some high schools allow students to do so at the
end of the second year. Regardless of the timing, most students would spend at least one whole
year totally focused on reviewing and preparing for the CEE without learning any new knowledge.
More importantly and related to my empirical work, if students do not perform well or are not
enrolled into the college or major that meets their expectations, households might wish to let them
repeat the 12th year (the last year in senior high school) and take one more chance next year in the
CEE.
This mode of high school time schedule provides a promising context in which to study house-
two out of physics, chemistry and biology and those in the social science track may choose two out of history, politics
and geography.
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hold educational investments caused by exogenous shocks. To be more specific, students entering
high school at the introduction year of new curriculum would have a totally different three-year
curriculum and CEE guideline from those entering just the year before. In terms of costs of re-
taking CEE, the last cohort under the old curriculum would be in a different situation compared
with other cohorts. For other cohorts, if they fail in their first trial at the end of their third year in
senior high school, they would choose to prepare for one more year and retake CEE one year later,
without spending additional time and effort getting familiar with new knowledge and methods un-
der new curriculum. However, for the last cohort under the old curriculum, their opportunity costs
are much higher since if they fail in their first trial in CEE and choose to retake one year later,
they have to face a different curriculum and CEE guideline. As a result, students in the last cohort
under old curriculum need to face a higher opportunity cost with respects to re-taking CEE. In my
empirical work, I utilize this exogenous shock faced by households with students in the last cohort
under old curriculum to study their educational investments.
Moreover, the process of introduction of the new curriculum makes this context a good one
in which to study the causal effect of different opportunity costs faced by cohorts under different
curricula. Between the year 2004 and 2010, the new curriculum as well as high school textbooks
and CEE guidelines were adopted in different provinces at different years. Students in old pre-
reform cohort would not be “partially treated" since the College Entrance Exam is based either on
the old curriculum or on the new one ([5]). By examining the sharp province by cohort variation
in school curricula, I can plausibly identify the causal effect of curriculum effect on household
educational investments.
However, the introduction year of the new curriculum was not randomly assigned to provinces.
Provinces introduced the new curriculum when they had successfully trained teachers and devel-
oped supplemental materials based on new textbooks ([5]). If this nonrandom assignment coincides
with different patterns in household educational investments, my identification strategy would be
invalid. I would address this concern later in my empirical analysis.
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4.2 Curriculum Reform and CEE Re-taking
This subsection shows evidence that the introduction of new curriculum causes a reduction in
the number of the CEE re-takers at the year when provinces switch curricula.
4.2.1 Data
Since both curriculum reform and CEE are organized and implemented by the provincial de-
partment of education, I then use panel data documenting the number of examinees across years
at the province level to analyze the relationship between the adoption of new curriculum and CEE
re-taking behavior.
The data used in this subsection are from Educational Statistics Yearbook of China, edited and
published by the Department of Development and Planning, Ministry of Education. Since infor-
mation of the number of participants of College Entrance Exam are only available in yearbooks
before 2010, I restrict my panel dataset to years between 1999 and 20106. One limitation of such
time range is that the period only witnessed the change in curriculum in 15 provinces, only half
of total provinces in mainland China. However, it is the only administrative dataset that clearly
divides the number of CEE participants into first-triers and re-takers at the provincial level, which
is a key feature of my empirical strategy.
The introduction year of the new curriculum at each province is shown in Figure 4.2. The 15
provinces that adopted the new curriculum between 2004 and 2007 vary both geographically and
economically, from provinces in comparatively developed coastal areas in the east (e.g. Guang-
dong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang) to those in western inland areas that are comparatively less developed,
from populous provinces in which the CEE is quite competitive (e.g. Anhui, Shandong) to provincial-
level municipalities in which resource of high-quality education is comparatively abundant.
Figure 4.3 shows the total number of participants in CEE from 1999 to 2010. It steadily in-
creased until it reached the peak in the year 2008, when more than 10 million participants took
CEE. With respect to CEE re-takers, the ratio is quite stable, around 20% to 25%. Overall, for
6Information of the number of participants of CEE is first available in 1999.
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Figure 4.3: Number of CEE participants and Share of Re-takers
every 5 students taking CEE, one would be the re-taker. Besides, Figure 4.4 and 4.5 show that the
trend of re-taking behavior does not differ much between rural and urban students during this pe-
riod, however, the ratio of CEE re-takers for students with rural registration is consistently higher.
Moreover, enrollment rate did not change much during the period 1999-2010, shown in figure
4.1. As has been mentioned, in 1998 Chinese government began expanding the scale of high
education. Consequently, there was a large jump of college enrollment rate between 1998 and
1999. Since then, it stayed quite stably until then end of 2000s, which coincides with the period of
my panel data, indicating that there were no huge changes on the supply side during that period7.
In addition, the probability that a student migrates to other provinces to take CEE is rare. In
China, the school roll status is tightly linked to the students’ Hukou status as well as their parents’.
For most migrant workers in cities without local residential status, their children’s school roll status
is still in their hometowns8. Students have to take the CEE in provinces where their school roll is
7Although the way of being enrolled into a college or university is not limited, including university-administered
screening tests (Zizhu Zhaosheng in Chinese), this admission process accounts for very small proportion and is re-
stricted to top elite universities. Most students still solely rely on the CEE test scores as the only criterion to apply for
college.
8Though recent policies allow some of migrant children to attend local primary school or junior high school with
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Figure 4.4: Number of CEE participants and Share of Re-takers for Rural Students
Figure 4.5: Number of CEE participants and Share of Re-takers for Urban Students
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registered. As a result, migrants in purpose of CEE is not a concern in this context.
4.2.2 Empirical Strategy
In order to study the casual relationship between the switch of new curriculum and the CEE re-
taking patterns at the province level, I employ the following generalized difference-in-differences
model:
Retakerj,t = β ∗New_Curriculumj,t + Provincej + Y eart + j,t (4.1)
whereRetakerj,t is different measures of CEE re-takers in province j at year t. New_Curriculumj,t
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when province j has its first cohort take CEE under new
curriculum in year t and 0 otherwise. In the regression, I include both the province dummies
and the year dummies to control for province and year specific characteristics. The coefficient of
interest is β, which reflects the effect of the curricula switch on CEE re-taking behavior.
One assumption using the difference-in-differences model is that both the treatment group and
control group should follow similar trends prior to treatment. Since not all provinces have their first
cohort taking CEE under new curriculum during the period 1999-2010 when data are available, I
consider those provinces that adopted new curriculum after 2007 as my control group9. Figure
4.6 to 4.9 show patterns of CEE re-takers over time for treatment provinces and control provinces
by year of new curriculum introduction. For example, Figure 4.6 shows the log number of exam
re-takers in provinces that introduced the new curriculum in 2004, which had their fist cohort
take CEE under new curriculum in 2007, relative to the control group with provinces that had not
introduced the new curriculum by 2010.
From these figures, several patterns emerge. The first is that for all years, the number of CEE
re-takers of adopting provinces in the treatment group exhibit similar trajectories with those non-
adopting provinces before the switch of curriculum, which serves as a support for common trends
assumption prior to treatment. Second, there is a huge decrease in all four years for number of
CEE re-takers in adopting provinces at the year of introduction of new curriculum. For example,
certain qualifications, their eligibility of attending secondary education is still not allowed.
9For those provinces, they never had any cohort taking CEE under new curriculum before 2010.
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Figure 4.6: Number of Exam Re-takers in 2007
Figure 4.7: Number of Exam Re-takers in 2008
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Figure 4.8: Number of Exam Re-takers in 2009
Figure 4.9: Number of Exam Re-takers in 2010
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Table 4.1: New Curriculum and CEE Re-takers
(1) (2) (3)
Numbers Ln(Numbers) Ratio
New Curriculum -16764.833∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(4931.436) (0.097) (0.010)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.860 0.952 0.803
Observations 372 372 341
Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
Re-taker ratio is as of the total number of previous-year exam takers.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
in Figure 4.6, in 2007, the average log number of CEE re-takers in the treatment group dropped
from 10.5 to around 10 while there is a little increase for provinces in the control group. Third, the
effect of curricula switch on CEE re-takers is only a one-period temporary effect while the number
of CEE re-takers would rebound to normal levels after the switch. For example, the decrease of
number of CEE re-takers in Figure 4.6 only occurred at the year 2007 when the new curriculum
was introduced. After that it went back to the normal trajectory similar with that of provinces in
the control group.
4.2.3 Results
The result from Equation 4.1 is shown in Table 4.1. After controlling for province and year
fixed effects, according to Column 1, in the province at the year of the first cohort taking CEE
under new curriculum, the re-takers of CEE drops by around 16,765 compared with other years,
around 3.5% lower in Column 3. In addition, all results from different specifications are significant
at the 1% level.
Moreover, a falsification test on estimates between different years relative to the introduction
year of new curriculum and the ratio of CEE re-takers is displayed in Figure 4.10. For different
cohorts, the coefficient is only significant at the year in which the new curriculum was introduced,
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Figure 4.10: Estimated Coefficients on CEE Re-taking Ratio
which also supports the fact the the adoption of the new curriculum significantly reduced the CEE
re-taking behavior.
Additionally, the data allow me to look into some heterogeneous effects between rural students
and urban students. Anecdotal evidence shows that students from rural areas are more likely to
re-take CEE since they value the education opportunity more than their urban counterparts given
their comparatively disadvantageous family economic conditions. [2] use data collected from a
second-tier university in Sichuan Province where rural students account for more than half, almost
40% students took the CEE at least twice. The results for urban and rural subsamples are shown
in the last two columns in Table 4.2. The negative effect of the curricula switch on CEE re-taking
behavior is larger for rural students.
In sum, results in this subsection establish the fact that the introduction of new curriculum
causes the reduction of the CEE re-taking behavior, both for rural and urban students. In the
subsection that follows, I will focus on how this changing opportunity costs from re-taking CEE
affect household educational investments.
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Table 4.2: Last Old Curriculum and Re-taking Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Whole Sample Rural Sample Urban Sample
New Curriculum -0.035∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.803 0.709 0.566
Observations 341 339 341
Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
Re-taker ratio is as of the total number of previous-year exam takers.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.3 Effects on Household Educational Investments
4.3.1 Data
The data I use to analyze the effects of the changing exam re-taking opportunity costs on
household educational investments are from the Beijing College Student Panel Survey (BCSPS),
conducted by National Survey Research Center of Renmin University of China. This survey was
conducted in several waves to make a panel. However, only the first wave is publicly accessible,
which is used in this paper. In the first wave, the sample includes 4,711 college students from
15 universities in Beijing who came from all over China10. The questionnaire covers detailed
information about students’ demographics and family backgrounds, their grades in high school and
score in CEE, their current academic, political performance in university, plans upon graduation
as well as attitudes towards various aspects. The first wave was conducted in the summer of 2009,
and interviewees are mainly freshmen and juniors, the majority of whom took CEE in 2006 or
2008.
Since the identification strategy relies on variations of students among the last cohorts under
old curriculum and those who are not, in the sample, students who took the CEE in Shandong,
10Almost all these 15 universities are ranked top 50 in mainland China. As a result, samples drawn from this
population consist of students who are regarded top ranked from CEE.
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Guangdong, Hainan, Ningxia in 2006, in Jiangsu Province in 2007 as well as in Beijing, Liaoning,
Zhejiang, Anhui and Fujian in 2008 are categorized into the treatment group, the number of which
is 524, accounting for 11% of all observations in the sample.
Typical household investments in children’s education during senior high school include asking
private tutors or attending out-of-school classes, purchasing electronic devices or reference books
that facilitate students’ learning efficiency, or accommodating a comforting living environment by
providing an independent study room or bedroom. Since this survey is mainly focused on the
students’ life in college while information about their high school is limited, I cannot measure
expenditures on the household’s investment on asking for private tutors or out-of-school classes.
Instead, I mainly focus on investments on the latter two forms. Specifically, the data allow me
to study whether students are endowed with a personal computer, Internet, cell phone, learning
machine (e.g. electronic dictionary) reference books (e.g. encyclopedia, hard-copy dictionaries) in
high school11.
4.3.2 Empirical Model
Similar to the empirical strategy in Section 4.2, I rely on a generalized difference-in-differences
model to estimate the effects of the changing opportunity costs in re-taking CEE caused by the
introduction of new curriculum on household educational investments. The regression equation is
as follows:
yi,j,c = β ∗ Last_Old_Curriculumj,c + γ ∗Xi,j,c + Provincej + Cohortc + i,j,c (4.2)
where yi,j,c is a list of dummy variables indicating whether student i in province j at the high school
entry cohort c was provided with the following equipments: a personal computer, Internet connec-
tion, learning machine and reference books during senior high school. Last_Old_Curriculumj,c
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when province j adopts the new curriculum for high
school entry cohort c + 1 and 0 otherwise. Put differently, Last_Old_Curriculumj,c represents
11Admittedly, compared with expenditures on asking for private tutors, investments measured in this paper are small
in amount and most of them are one-time expenditures.
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the last cohort under old curriculum in province j. Therefore, β is the coefficient of interest, cap-
turing the changing-opportunity-cost effect. Provincej and Cohortc are full sets of province and
cohort fixed effects. In addition, a list of control variables in Xi,j,c is added to measure individual
level characteristic and household level background that would affect the household educational
investment decisions, including gender, ethnicity (i.e., whether the student is from a minority peo-
ple), whether the student held a rural Hukou when in high school, whether the student had sib-
lings, whether the student was from an elite senior high school. Also included are two variables
indicating the family economic status and education level of the student’s father, which are key
determinants of levels of household educational expenditures in China ([11]). In the dataset, fam-
ily annual income is provided, but it is related to the last year of the survey which corresponds
to the year 2008 when more than half of students have already attended college for at least two
years, which might reflect some measurement errors after the students graduated from senior high
school. Instead, I use the self-reported family economic status variable to index for the family
economic condition. My assumption is that the family comparative economic condition would not
change since the student was in high school. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at
the province-cohort level.
My empirical model is similar to [5], who use their survey data in Peking University to study
the effects of the introduction of the new curriculum on students’ political attitudes and ideology.
In this paper, I make use of the same framework with respect to the curriculum reform. However, I
focus on different levels of CEE re-taking opportunity costs caused by this exogenous curriculum
change. Therefore, my key independent variable is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the student is among the last cohort under the old curriculum. Similar to their paper, this framework
allows me to address several concerns about the identification method. First, since I have controlled
for province fixed effects and exploited cross-cohort variation within provinces, the province-level
differences in the valuation of entering into an elite college and the opportunity costs of re-taking
CEE would not be a concern. Second, one might be concerned about the evolution of the attitudes
towards re-taking CEE across cohorts without curriculum switch. In this framework, I would be
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able to difference out these cross-cohort changes by including the cohort fixed effects. Moreover,
this empirical model would allow me to rule out confounding factors such as some province time-
varying shocks that affect neighboring cohorts similarly. I will address any additional concerns
later in robustness checks.
4.3.3 Balance of Student Characteristics
Summary statistics of the survey sample are provided in Column 1 from Table 4.3, while Col-
umn 3 and 5 show the mean characteristics of students by subgroups. One concern of the identifi-
cation strategy is the lack of the balance resulted from different selection into treatment and control
groups. Thus, I first check for balance of observed characteristics between treatment and control
groups in the sample before presenting estimation results.
In Column 7, I provide differences of mean for measures of characteristics between treatment
and control groups, while Column 8 presents p-values using the simple t-test with the null hy-
pothesis that the differences of the two groups are indifferent from zero. It is clear to see that
there exists significant differences across these two groups. [5] argue that this unconditional im-
balance is to be expected due to the fact the new curriculum was introduced later in time and the
assignment of introduction years across provinces were nonrandom, resulting in differences across
students from different provinces. Thus, I follow their method by showing the differences between
students across groups, conditional on province and cohort fixed effects, with the p-values testing
for the statistical significance of these conditional differences. In all specifications, the standard
errors are clustered at the province-cohort level. It is apparent that after accounting for average
characteristics in the province where students spent their senior high school and accounting for
average characteristics of a cohort, the differences of the two groups become statistically insignif-
icant on most observable characteristics. The only significant characteristic is students’ minority
status. Specifically, the proportion of students (6.30%) who are among the last cohort under old
curriculum is much smaller than that of students who are not (11.89%). One possible reason is that
in the sample period, most of the minority-populous provinces and autonomous regions did not
witness the change of curriculum (except Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, which is the smallest
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among the five autonomous regions). Thus, it is reasonable to expect not many minority students
among the last cohort under old curriculum. I would also include the minority dummy in the base-
line model to control for any systematic differences between Han people and those minorities. In
addition, I will restrict my sample with only Han students in the robustness check.
Moreover, Table 4.4 shows the comparison of means for a list of outcome variables. From
the simple comparison, it is difficult to tell any differences between the last cohort under old
curriculum and other cohorts. Thus it is interesting to see whether such differences in household
educational investment exist after controlling for other characteristics including both province and
year fixed effects.
4.3.4 Regression Results
The estimation results using the generalized difference-in-differences model in Equation 4.2 are
provided in Table 4.5. I estimate the curriculum reform on household educational investment such
as equipments and devices that can facilitate students’ learning efficiency. Most of the coefficients
of the last old curriculum variable are significant at least at the 5% level. Households with students
from the last cohort under old curriculum would increase their investment in laptops, reference
books, learning machines, PCs as well as Internet. Compared with the mean of the cohorts that are
not under the last old curriculum, the possibility that the household has laptops is 13.20% higher
while it is only 3.25% higher for a household that has a student under the last old curriculum to be
equipped with reference books.
Another type of household educational investments is by providing comforting living environ-
ments for their children in high school, such as independent bedroom or study room. However, I
did not find evidence of such investments in the sample. In Table 4.6, none of the coefficients with
respect to the last cohort under old curriculum dummy are significant. One interpretation of the
insignificant result is that unlike the electronics, living conditions are less likely to be accommo-
dated, as household would be less likely to buy a larger apartment simply because their children
are among the cohort under the last curriculum and their opportunity costs of re-taking CEE is
higher. Moreover, in some high schools in China, students who live far from campus may choose
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Table 4.4: Summary Statititics by Last Old Curriculum Cohort
Last Old=0 Last Old=1
Laptop 0.095 0.109
(0.293) (0.311)
Reference Books 0.768 0.799
(0.422) (0.401)
Learning Machines 0.605 0.605
(0.489) (0.489)
Internet 0.616 0.644
(0.486) (0.479)
PC 0.677 0.708
(0.468) (0.455)
Study Room 0.541 0.596
(0.498) (0.491)
Own Room 0.832 0.874
(0.374) (0.333)
Cell Phone 0.334 0.298
(0.472) (0.458)
Leisure Books 0.626 0.660
(0.484) (0.474)
Video Games 0.320 0.246
(0.467) (0.431)
Observations 4207 562
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented.
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Table 4.5: Last Old Curriculum and Household Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Laptop Reference Books Learning Machine Internet Computer
Last Old Curri 0.022∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.023 0.038∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.007) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Male 0.010 -0.024 -0.066∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗
(0.008) (0.019) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
Minority -0.009 -0.003 0.012 0.028∗ 0.001
(0.013) (0.023) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020)
Rural -0.038∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022)
Elite HS -0.005 -0.004 0.002 -0.031 -0.023
(0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020)
Siblings -0.066∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016)
Family Status 0.018 0.016 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023)
Father Edu -0.002 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.044 0.263 0.272 0.458 0.457
Observations 4450 4452 4452 4451 4452
Standard errors are clustered at the province-cohort level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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to live in dormitories inside schools12.
Besides the key independent variable, the relationship between other control variables included
in the estimation equation and household educational investments are also shown in both tables.
Most of these variables are in line with expectation. For example, male students are less likely
to own learning devices. Being from a rural household significantly reduces the possibility being
provided with learning devices and good living environment, which reflect huge inequalities with
respect to educational expenditures between rural and urban households.
In addition, students from wealthier families or with more educated father are likely to be
accommodated with good living conditions. This result is in line with [11], who also find empir-
ically that household income and parents’ levels of education are key determinants of household
educational investments.
As a measure of placebo test, in Table 4.7, I show the result using the same framework only
with the outcome variable being replaced with a list of devices that are mostly used for leisure, such
as leisure books, cell phones and PSP. As expected, these results are negative and insignificantly
different from zero.
In addition, I also conduct a series of falsification tests, I regress the outcome variables on the
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the cohort is among the second last cohort under the old
curriculum. Results in Table 4.8 show that most of the coefficients are not significantly different
from zero and some are even negative, implying that this difference is not likely to exist before the
switch of curricula.
4.3.5 Robustness Checks and Additional Discussions
I then explore the robustness of the baseline results from the previous subsection.
When comparing the balances of the sample divided by whether students are among the last
cohort under old curriculum or not, I find the proportion of minorities is significantly smaller for the
treatment group. In order to address the concern that households from minority groups might have
12Such living information is not available in the dataset, so I cannot directly test this hypothesis by simply restricting
the sample to those who commute to school from home everyday.
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Table 4.6: Last Old Curriculum and Household Investment
(1) (2)
Study Room Independent Bedroom
Last Old Curri -0.008 0.028
(0.019) (0.025)
Male -0.014 0.011
(0.013) (0.012)
Minority 0.002 -0.017
(0.027) (0.018)
Rural -0.205∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.029)
Elite HS 0.014 0.025∗
(0.021) (0.014)
Siblings -0.089∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019)
Family Status 0.159∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.009)
Father Edu 0.051∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Province FE Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes
R2 0.222 0.159
Observations 4449 4452
Standard errors are clustered at the province-cohort level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Last Old Curriculum and Household Investment
(1) (2) (3)
Cell Phone Leisure Books PSP
Last Old Curri -0.014 -0.011 -0.025
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026)
Male -0.010 0.004 0.164∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.018)
Minority -0.005 -0.024 0.064∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Rural -0.071∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.020) (0.022)
Elite HS -0.008 -0.010 -0.039∗∗
(0.021) (0.015) (0.018)
Siblings -0.059∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.024) (0.019) (0.018)
Family Status -0.004 0.055∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.021) (0.019)
Father Edu 0.011∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.011∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.072 0.298 0.096
Observations 4449 4452 4452
Standard errors are clustered at the province-cohort level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.8: Second Last Old Curriculum and Household Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Laptop Reference Books Learning Machine Internet Computer
2nd Last Old -0.016 -0.045∗∗ 0.019 0.021 -0.009
(0.017) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.044 0.262 0.272 0.458 0.456
Observations 4450 4452 4452 4451 4452
Standard errors are clustered at the province-cohort level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.9: Robustness: Han Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Laptop Reference Books Learning Machine Internet Computer
Last Old Curri 0.020∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.010 0.042∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.008) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.048 0.256 0.266 0.466 0.463
Observations 3960 3962 3962 3961 3962
Standard errors are clustered at the province-cohort level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
different value on education, especially when students of minority peoples often enjoy extra points
in CEE, I restrict the sample to only students from Han People, which account for 88.45% for
all observations. The result from Table 4.9 shows that the coefficients of the last cohort under old
curriculum do not differ much from the baseline result, both in magnitude and level of significance.
Another issue in my baseline sample is that all students are included regardless of whether
they are under the new curriculum or old one. One might be concerned that some topics from
the new curriculum might require students to be equipped with more advanced learning devices or
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Table 4.10: Robustness: Old Curriculum Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Laptop Reference Books Learning Machine Internet Computer
Last Old Curri 0.022∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.022 0.037∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.007) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.044 0.262 0.272 0.459 0.456
Observations 4370 4372 4372 4371 4372
Standard errors are clustered at the province-cohort level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
teachers may encourage students to use such devices more and search for information, either on-
line or from reference books, leading students to behave differently when they are under different
curricula. First, I use similar strategy as the placebo test and replace my key independent variable
with the dummy variable taking on the value of 1 for the first cohort in the province under new
curriculum, results show insignificant coefficients. Second, I limit the sample to cohorts only under
old curriculum. The results from Table 4.10 imply that this is not a big issue.
Another question about the empirical analysis is whether the adoption of the new curriculum
coincided with some provincial variations that might affect household level input at the province-
cohort level. One might argue that government spending on secondary education is a good substi-
tute for household educational expenditures on children in senior high school. For example, [52]
provide such evidence from student in primary and junior high school. If senior high schools have
already provided plenty of computers and Internet connection, or students can easily obtain refer-
ence books from school library, then some of the effects may be driven by school spending change.
I thus follow [5] to control for provincial spending on secondary education at the province-cohort
level that is calculated as a province’s average level of spending during the 3 years of senior high
school for each cohort. The data are from the Educational Finance Statistical Yearbook of China
(2002-2008) published by the Department of Finance in the Ministry of Education. As can be seen
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Table 4.11: Robustness: Province-Cohort level Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Laptop Reference Books Learning Machine Internet Computer
Last Old Curri 0.018∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.017 0.030∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.007) (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.045 0.263 0.273 0.460 0.457
Observations 4450 4452 4452 4451 4452
Standard errors are clustered at the province-cohort level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
from Table 4.11, the inclusion of the province-cohort level control variable does not qualitatively
change the estimated effects of changing opportunity costs on household educational investments.
Moreover, as has been mentioned before, the introduction year of the new curriculum is not
randomly assigned across provinces. One might be interested in the determinants of a province
adopting the new curriculum in a particular year and be concerned that these factors might also
affect household investment. According to the [5], their most robust finding is that greater province
income in 2003 is quite predictive of earlier introduction of the new curriculum while educational
variables are generally less predictive. To empirically dealing with this concern, I follow their
strategy to control for the interaction between a province’s 2003 Gross Regional Product per capita
and cohort fixed effects. From the results shown in Table 4.12, one can see that the findings are not
affected after these controls are included.
Furthermore, it is interesting to see whether there exist some long-run effects of this extra
investment from household when students have been enrolled in college. Since students in the
sample are from different majors in different universities, their scores in classes are not comparable.
Instead, I use their College English Test-4 (CET-4) scores as a proxy for some long-run effects.
CET-4 is a nationwide English test for all undergraduates and passing this test is one of the most
important requirements for graduation. In addition, across years, the test is in similar levels of
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Table 4.12: Robustness: Controlling for 2003 Provincial GRP*Cohort FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Laptop Reference Books Learning Machine Internet Computer
Last Old Curri 0.022∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.046 0.263 0.274 0.460 0.457
Observations 4388 4389 4389 4388 4389
Standard errors are clustered at the province-cohort level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
difficulty and has the same passing grade, making it a reasonable proxy for learning outcomes for
comparison of students across universities and years. The result from Table 4.13 indicates that
such long-run effect is minimal, implying there might not be a significant difference for students
due to such extra investment after they enter college.
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Table 4.13: Last Old Curriculum and Long-run Effects
(1)
CET-4 Score
Last Old Curri -3.198
(12.749)
Male -22.001∗∗∗
(2.126)
Minority -13.768∗∗∗
(4.341)
Rural -4.618
(3.851)
Elite HS 8.320
(5.747)
Siblings -4.247
(3.367)
Family Status 16.025∗∗∗
(4.910)
Father Edu 3.867∗∗∗
(1.334)
Province FE Yes
Cohort FE Yes
R2 0.202
Observations 2167
Standard errors are clustered at the province-cohort level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, I study the development of China in different perspectives.
First, a large wave of newly added households in urban areas exists simply because the areas
they live in have been reclassified from rural to urban. These in situ migrants comprised almost
35% of total urban population growth from 2010 to 2015; they had little demand in urban housing
markets since they “bring” their own housing units into urban areas. To quantify its scale, I simply
combine our estimated scale of in situ migrants with information regarding their living conditions
from descriptive evidence found in CHFS datasets. Results show that between 2010 to 2015, in
situ migrants account for 33.65 million, which is approximately 8.88 million households from
reclassified communities. Around 94% of these households have their own housing units. As a
result, they brought around 8.35 million housing units into urban areas. Combining results from [7]
by employing similar assumptions, from 2000 to 2010, these in situ migrants brought around 30.4
million housing units into urban areas. In total, during the first 15 years of this new millennium,
the scale of newly added urban households from in situ migrants almost 40% and they brought
around 38.75 million housing units into urban areas, accounting for nearly 80% of total number
of vacant housing units estimated by CHFS in 2014. This result provides evidence in favor of
the high vacancy rate found by CHFS. In fact, when comparing the added urban housing units
and urban households, the scale of in situ migrants has been taken into account in calculating the
increment of newly added urban households but the housing units brought by these in situ migrants
are not taken into account in considering the increments of newly added urban housing units. This
mismatch due to neglecting the group of in situ migrants causes excess supply which in turn leads
to large numbers of vacant housing units in urban China.
Accompanied by rapid economic development, in 2016 China’s urbanization rate reached
58.4%. A large wave of the population migrated and settled in urban areas, causing a consis-
tent demand for housing. As a result, urbanization is considered to be an important factor for the
enlarged urban housing demand. In this paper, however, I find that a large share of all new urban
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residents during the first half of the 2010s actually came from communities that were reclassified
from rural to urban. Relying on the rural-urban division codes which are issued by the National
Bureau of Statistics every year, I estimate that around 35% of the total urban population growth
from 2010 to 2015 resulted from rural-urban dichotomy reclassification.
Further exploration of the demographic and economic characteristics of reclassified communi-
ties and in situ migrants finds descriptive evidence that these communities are far less urbanized
than those in urban areas; most households still live in houses that they built on collectively-owned
land, and have little demand to participate in local housing markets. I then use prefecture-level land
supply data and our measures of urban population growth to empirically estimate the relationship
between local land supply and different types of urban population growth. Our results show that
the elasticity of the scale of in situ migrants is both larger in magnitude and more significant than
that of real urban population growth. If this is the case, I can anticipate large amounts of surplus
housing units, especially in cities with large scales of in situ migrants. All of this evidence sup-
ports a recent finding from the China Household Finance Survey that there exist around 50 million
vacant housing units in urban China.
Secondly, motivated by the theory that property rights and well-functioning institutions are
important for development and given the fact that findings of effects of securing agricultural land
tenure are mixed in China, I focus on the rural land certification program in China’s countryside
and empirically test its effects on agricultural land utilization at the community level by adopting
a panel dataset from the community questionnaires of China Household Finance Survey in 2015
and 2017. Using panel data fixed-effects model, I have three main findings.
First, my results show that land certification has a positive effect on reducing abandoned agri-
cultural land. Moreover, the effects are more significant in high-income villages or those located
in provinces with higher share of GDP from agricultural sector. Second, I do not find significant
relationships between secure land tenure and other outcomes such as the improvement in produc-
tivity or off-farm labor participation. In addition, though I do not find a significant effect on overall
land transfer activity, there is descriptive evidence from the most recent round of survey showing
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that in certified villages, the size of land transferred to agricultural business entities is much larger
than that in non-certified villages and the rent is also higher. I also find supporting results using
my household-level panel data.
Land is a key asset for rural household. In China, given the fact that the property right is
separated from its ownership right, keeping tenure secure is of great importance for stabilizing
relationship between rural households and collectives. In this paper, findings from this paper only
suggest a improvement in land utilization. As a result, endowing rural households with full prop-
erty security is still essential for rural development.
Finally, I document how the curriculum change guided by the Chinese Ministry of Education
has caused different levels of opportunity costs with respect to re-taking the College Entrance
Exam in mainland China. Furthermore, I show how this changing levels of opportunity costs
result in different household educational investments on senior high school students. I first employ
provincial-level panel data and show that the CEE re-taking is significantly lower at the year when
provinces switched senior high school curricula. Due to the change of the curriculum and the
CEE guideline, the opportunity costs of a student to re-take CEE are much higher for the last
cohort under old curriculum. I then adopt the Beijing College Student Panel Survey to empirically
test whether this exogenous policy change leads to different household investment behavior on
students’ education. Due to the limitation of the dataset, it is inaccessible to test expenditures such
as asking for private tutors and attending out-of-school classes. Instead, I test this change on the
household investments in electronic devices as well as comforting living environments.
Results show that effects of the changing opportunity costs by curricula switch on the house-
hold educational investment are noticeable. Households with children in the last cohort under old
curriculum would invest more on electronic devices that improve their learning efficiency. How-
ever, I do not find such investment has any long-run effect when their CET-4 test scores are used
for proxy, implying that these inputs might be only helpful when students are in senior high school.
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